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Abstract 
 
Selling the Beat, Visualizing the Rhythm: 
MTV, Propaganda Films, and Convergent Media in the 1980s 
 
Christopher Daniel Montes, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Thomas Schatz 
 
In the early 1980s, American media industries were changing at a rapid pace. 
New technologies and corporate structures influenced a new crop of media content 
indicative of an ever-diversifying mediascape. Influenced by this continuing evolution, 
the Warner-Amex corporation developed a platform to showcase a new kind of content 
form, music videos, that sought to mix the flow of radio broadcast with filmed popular 
music entertainment: MTV, music television. MTV stood as the go-to source for music 
videos in the United States and became a cultural touchstone in itself. The cable, 
recording, and advertising industries all had a hand in the channel’s development and had 
to overcome the industrial tensions such an initiative would bring. How would profits be 
earned? Who produces what? And where will the money come from? Despite its 
successful premiere on August 1 1981, MTV still underwent a number of 
transformations, both industrially and culturally, to become the media giant it still is 
today. One result of this platform’s rise in prominence was a need to produce content that 
would fit well on this new-look channel. Seeing this opportunity, a group of filmmakers 
 vi 
formed Propaganda Films in 1986 in order to produce music videos and television 
advertisements for MTV and other broadcast platforms. These filmmakers, including 
Hollywood auteurs Steve Golin, Nigel Dick, Dominic Sena, and David Fincher, would 
have a profound influence on music videos and television advertisements, bringing a 
distinctive style and authorial vision to non-feature film Hollywood productions. My 
research details the formation of MTV, the founding of Propaganda Films, and the formal 
components of Propaganda’s music videos and television advertisements as a means to 
engage the convergent trends of American media industries during this period. 
Propaganda Films, a prolific and repeatedly well-regarded organization in the 
entertainment industry, has yet to have a comprehensive scholarly analysis of its 
involvement in American media history. My aim is to simultaneously detail a previously 
underrepresented historical case while providing an interdisciplinary means in which to 
engage various content forms that are an important component of our media-making 
cultures and traditions. 
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Introduction 
In 1986, a cadre of young filmmakers - Steve Golin, Jani Sighvatsson, Greg Gold, 
Nigel Dick, Dominic Sena, and David Fincher – founded Propaganda Films, a film 
production company that ultimately produced hundreds of music videos for top recording 
artists between 1986 and 2000. Propaganda utilized its filmmaking talent to produce an 
assortment of content in three primary media forms: music videos, television 
advertisements, and feature films. From 1986 to 1991, when Polygram Entertainment 
acquired the company, Propaganda produced scores of music videos for Madonna, Janet 
Jackson, Guns N’ Roses, Paula Abdul, Tina Turner, and Billy Idol. Their commercials 
also made a splash in the industry, winning a number of awards including multiple 
Cannes Lions, one of the more respectable honors in the advertising industry.1 The 
company’s output would fit the moniker of “high concept,” which scholar Justin Wyatt 
described as “one result of the tension between the economics and aesthetics on which 
commercial studio filmmaking is based.” From Fincher’s “Smoking Fetus” PSA for the 
American Cancer Society (the title adequately describes the content) to Dominic Sena’s 
“Nike Heritage” commercial for Nike, the company produced slick and stark imagery for 
products and brands. These images were the result of commercial dealings with a number 
of media industries, including the cable industry, the recording industry, the advertising 
industry, and the film industry. Thus, Propaganda Films stands as a quintessential 
example of media-convergent practices typical of the 1980s in the United States and 
around the world.  
The film industry was entering a new stage in its own development, transforming 
into an industry that actively diversified its output. “As a result of these transformations, 
Hollywood ceased operating as a film industry,” states scholar Stephen Prince. “Instead 
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of making films, the industry shifted to the production of filmed entertainment, a quite 
different enterprise that encompassed the production and distribution of entertainment in 
a variety of markets and media.”2 The commercial aspects of this type of venture were 
not lost on Propaganda’s founders. “I came up with the name Propaganda,” claims 
founder Dominic Sena. “I thought, That’s what we’re doing, we’re selling propaganda.”3 
However, Sena’s sense of Propaganda was not political but capitalistic, a promotion of 
products that heralded a consumer culture spurred by new forms of media.  
 Scholar Tim Dwyer views media convergence as “the process whereby 
new technologies are accommodated by existing media and communication industries 
and cultures.”4 This process details the intersections of distinct media and information 
technology systems that had previously been though of as separate and self-contained. 
For MTV’s creation, distinct systems were cable operators, record labels, and advertisers. 
Italian scholar Leopoldina Fortunatti speaks of a process in which these convergent 
practices simultaneously unify media and yet at the same time promote diversification.5 
Such changes are not merely a summation of these various components, but exponential 
or emergent.6 These observations are to point out that the complex, evolutionary, 
adaptive, and organic processes at stake within MTV’s development. It is not simply a 
“media-building” site, but a dynamic and vibrant locale for continued changes and 
tensions between producers, media distributers, and the audience itself.7 My research 
seeks to highlight these tensions and developments keeping this industrial convergent 
framework in mind.  
The tensions between the cable industry, the record industry, and the advertising 
industry were typical of new trends in industrial structure, but they were ultimately 
alleviated in light of a slow-to-come but inevitable success. Music video’s promotional 
nature fit well along side the television advertisement’s own capitalistic methods. The 
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“MTV style” of many music video productions would ultimately influence television 
advertisement’s own formal elements, as I will discuss in the last chapter. Such 
developments blurred the line between music videos and television ads, where a “MTV-
style” would come to define much of television advertising in the late 80s and early 90s. 
My chronicling of MTV’s creation speaks more of the industrial nature of these trends. 
Convergent practices that emerged during the late-70s and early-80s, such as that of a 
video-radio station for the then-new cable television platform, continue to play a 
legitimizing role in media industry strategies and policy making.8 That being said, it is 
hard to ignore the cultural impact of a network like MTV and nearly impossible to 
separate those influences from industrial practice, as evidenced by the criticisms of MTV 
lacking diversity and the station’s eventual diversification after the success of Michael 
Jackson’s “Thriller” music video.  
Propaganda’s work in both music video and advertisement productions enabled its 
filmmakers to promote their own careers in terms of both their technical and conceptual 
strengths. They also promoted a valuable ability of mixing provocative imagery with 
commercial branding, showcasing a product or service with a cohesive and distinctive 
vision. Beginning in 1986, Propaganda enabled pop artists to sell their music, directors to 
sell their style, and the company as a whole to sell its content – music videos, feature 
films, and commercials – to an industry seeking new forms of filmed entertainment in 
both television and cinema.  Propaganda’s position in American entertainment industry 
history begins to undermine a tendency to place these concepts firmly into a Hollywood 
feature-filmmaking discourse. Music videos and commercials are produced and 
constructed with methods and traditions developed by an established American film 
industry. But must this narrative incorporate the complexities of multiple media platforms 
and changing forms of cinematic style? How do these texts utilize aesthetics to convey 
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commercial success through a trusted brand? My thesis addresses these questions and 
provides a potential framework in which to approach music videos and television 
advertisements of this period, providing additional perspectives to the already 
complicated narrative of American filmed entertainment throughout the 1980s and the 
beginning of the next decade. 
I begin by chronicling of MTV’s development as a result of convergent practices 
between various media industries and how such a platform would enable a company like 
Propaganda to succeed in the music video and television advertisement industries 
simultaneously. I will discuss particular factors of industrial convergence within the 
cable, recording, and advertising industries utilizing a variety of scholars who have 
specialized in these subjects’ interactions, such as William Kunz in Culture 
Conglomerates: Consolidation in the Motion Picture and Television Industry (2007), 
Raymond Williams in Television – Technology and Cultural Forum (2003), and Thomas 
Baldwin, D. Stevens McCoy, and Charles Steinfeld’s collaborative study in 
Convergence: Integrating Media, Information, & Communications (1996).  These 
scholars give light to certain practices, such as budgeting and marketing, and their effects 
on other industries. MTV was susceptible to these market changes and its success stems 
from the ability to adapt to these trends.  
Unlike Propaganda Films, which had very little documented about its formation 
and creation in academic literature, MTV has had a number of comprehensive historical 
narratives constructed. These historiographies come in various forms, whether orally, 
such as Robert Sam Wilson’s “Birth of an MTV Nation” (2000) and Craig Marks and 
Robert Tannenbaum’s I Want My MTV: The Uncensored Story of the Music Video 
Revolution (2011), analytically, Kevin William’s Why I [Still] Want My MTV, 2003; E. 
Ann Kaplan’s Rocking Around the Clock (1987), or industrially like R. Serge Denisoff’s 
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incredibly detailed Inside MTV (1988). Each of these works primarily focuses on the 
group of individuals, led by Michael Pittman, who founded and developed MTV’s launch 
in 1981. My own aim is to meld these varying perspectives together while framing them 
within the aforementioned convergent literature. In order to transfer this analytic 
framework towards the particular platforms of Hollywood-produced music videos and 
commercials, the work of Stephen Prince’s excellent chronicling of the decade in A New 
Pot of Gold: Hollywood Under the Electric Rainbow, 1980 – 1989 (2002), Justin Wyatt’s 
High Concept (1994), Kevin Williams’ Why I [Still] Want My MTV (2003), Saul 
Austerlitz’s Money for Nothing: A History of Music Video (2007), and Harold Vogel’s 
Entertainment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis (1998) clarifies how 
music videos function as promotional material.  
For the final chapter’s formal analysis, my conceptual framework and analytic 
ideology are partially inspired by the work of David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson, and 
Janet Staiger in The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style & Mode of Production to 
1960 in that this survey of Propaganda Film’s various texts hopes to argue for a “coherent 
system whereby aesthetic norms and the mode of film production reinforced one 
another.”9  Like Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson, my analysis involved watching 
dozens of music videos and television advertisements to glean a cohesive mode of style - 
a style largely reflective of a filmmaking vision that promotes both Propaganda notoriety 
and a pop star’s album sales. Analyses of these texts’ formal qualities during this period 
are notably absent from academic discourse, especially for music videos and television 
advertising. Roland Marchand’s work in Advertising the American Dream: Making Way 
for Modernity, 1920-1940 provides a foundational theorization of the power of thematic 
imagery in conveying capitalism through cultural cues. For music videos, Carol Vernallis 
- one of the few scholars who has written a book-length study on music video aesthetics – 
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engages the medium as both a musical and a cinematic text, creating a new aura in which 
musicality, discontinuity, and star-power operate to create a new form of motion-picture 
viewing. Her book’s title, Experiencing Music Videos, highlights the idea of 
“experience.” With a background in music theory and history, Vernallis claims music 
comes “first – the song is produced before the video is conceived – and the director 
normally designs images with the song as guide.”10 My work will rarely touch on the 
composition and structure of popular music in the 80s, and I will argue that music videos 
not only “follow” (to use Vernallis’ phrase) a song but also incorporate non-musical 
aesthetics and other formal attributes to generate their own modes of stylization. Thus, I 
challenge Vernallis’ view that music video visuals “follow” the music. Rather, visuals 
often create their own narratives in which the music is but one factor of a music video’s 
aesthetic components. I will apply this form of formal analysis to Propaganda’s television 
advertisements as well in order to emphasize the cohesive nature of the company’s 
output. 
The final two chapters on Propaganda Films will cover the period between 1986 
and 1991. The basis for this bracketing is twofold. First, it corresponds to Propaganda’s 
stance as an independent producer, where its prolific production of music videos and 
advertisements garnered acclaim from the recording and advertising industries as the go-
to production company. The second basis is that 1991 was the year in which Propaganda 
was purchased by Polygram as a means to expand Polygram’s media making capabilities 
beyond recorded music, ending the company’s independence from a larger media 
organization. Through a mixture of industrial and formal analysis, I hope to chart 
Propaganda Films’ corporate history, structures, and creative output, a subject that has 
had very little to no attention in American film and entertainment literature, both 
scholarly and popular.  
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My plan is to utilize varying theoretical frameworks - historiographical, industrial, 
and formal - to detail how MTV and Propaganda Films exemplified the transformative 
and convergent trends of the American media industry during the 1980s. In doing so, I 
will engage a variety of texts across multiple media platforms and place them within the 
context of these organization’s active attempts to make waves in the industry and 
promote their own brand image. This will enable my scholarship to account for the 
inherent mixture of aesthetic style and commercial strategies that go hand-in-hand with 
the traditions of American filmmaking during the period. My observations of 
Propaganda’s use of style in its music videos and television advertisements will 
contextualize a formal approach within an industrial discourse. A study of Propaganda’s 
oeuvre, which can only begin to touch on how scholars may analyze music videos and 
television advertisements in general, must address the dual nature of these works – as 
both visual text and branding strategy.  
My research incorporates a diverse set of methods, namely discursive, formal, and 
qualitative analysis. To engage the discourse at the time, I studied a variety of trade press 
publications, including Variety, Billboard, Advertising Age, and Forbes amongst others. 
Also national publications such as The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and USA 
Today, allude to Propaganda’s success in the industry. These sources often describe 
Propaganda with flattering monikers, such as being “the only real brand” in the music 
video and television commercial business.11 However, defining the exact make-up of 
Propaganda’s output has proven difficult. A quick search through a number of online 
databases indicates little about the history and particulars of Propaganda’s completed 
projects. For instance, there is no single source detailing its definitive filmography. Even 
comprehensive websites such as IMDb fail to have incomplete listings of the studio’s 
output.12 The most useful sources have been interviews with producers Steve Golin, Joni 
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Sighvatsson, Dominic Sena, and Nigel Dick conducted over the past decade, many of 
them conducted after Propaganda’s closure in 1999. For this project, I have formulated 
my own curated sample of Propaganda’s content from a variety of sources, including 
IMDb and other fan-curated sites such as FincherFanatic.com, and mvdbase.com, and by 
personal accounts of Propaganda’s employees via their personal websites or various 
interviews.  
Finally, my analysis incorporates a number of interviews with Propaganda’s 
employees I myself have conducted. While my access to filmmakers David Fincher, 
Dominic Sena, Steve Golin and Joni Sighvatsson has been extremely limited, I have been 
able to speak to a couple of Propaganda’s employees, notably director Nigel Dick and 
film editor Michael Heldman. Both filmmakers were willing to discuss their roles in 
Propaganda’s structure and give detail on the company’s make-up and culture. These 
interviews contribute to a much-needed chronicling of Propaganda’s initial history and 
fill some of the holes in the company’s notable but rarely detailed narrative during this 
early period. 
My thesis is comprised of three chapter. Chapter 1 details MTV’s formation as a 
site of industrial convergence. While the televized promotion of commercial music was 
by no means a new phenomenon in American media, broadcasted music videos stood at 
the intersection of the cable, recording, and advertising industries. MTV’s formation was 
the result of managing the tensions between these converging industries though the music 
video, or “music clip” as they were called in 1981. Often, as I will detail in the following 
chapters, MTV oversaw what content would fit a broadcast ideology of non-overt 
commercialization. In 1983, Michael Jackson’s “Thriller” music video raised the 
standards of music video production with its higher budget and direct involvement with 
Hollywood filmmakers.13 This set a precedent for a new more elaborate method of 
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producing music videos, a method Propaganda would utilize in the later half of the 
decade. My discursive analysis will utilize press and trade publications from the mid-
eighties to highlight how the entertainment industry responded to these trends. Also, I 
will utilize a variety of secondary sources to give theoretical frameworks to these 
convergent and analysis them industrially as textual, cultural, and commercial product.  
Chapter 2 profiles the founders of Propaganda Films, its formation, and functions 
through its first five years as a company. I will detail various components of 
Propaganda’s business model – including the founder’s strategy for entering the industry, 
maintaining a steady stream of income and projects, and production practices. While 
Propaganda’s work deploys kinetic and visually striking depictions of brand culture and 
popular culture, I am interested in the inner-working of such an organization. Extremely 
little has been written about Propaganda’s early production, budget, distribution 
practices, and company culture. Propaganda is often discussed vaguely through 
ideological ideas of how the company took part in various industries and how it blazed a 
trail other organizations later followed. My aim is to depict what happened inside 
Propaganda, rather than how Propaganda influenced the outside world. For the 
production process in particular, I will detail the making of one of Propaganda’s high-
profile music videos: Nigel Dick’s music video for Guns ‘n Roses’ “Welcome to the 
Jungle” based primarily on an interview I conducted with the director for this project.  
In Chapter 3, I will conduct a formal analysis of Propaganda’s music videos and 
television advertisements between 1986 and 1991.  In doing so, I will be expanding on 
the various formal “modes of style” utilized by a Propaganda’s filmmakers to 
simultaneously make themselves and their pop star clients stand out amongst the 
exponentially growing medium of music video production. I will begin with a discussion 
on how music videos are traditionally analyzed, either as a product of MTV’s presence 
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on cable television or as a simple extension of a particular song, a supplementary visual 
component of an audial text. With MTV being such an influential presence, the history of 
music videos often directly stems from that particular channel’s history in cable 
broadcasting: the creation of the VJ, the continuous flow of music video programming, 
and the establishment of events like the MTV Video Music Awards. This history is often 
placed under the discursive structure of popular music and music theory. I hope to 
approach these works visually and formally. In viewing these videos, we can then see 
aesthetic methods utilized by a group of filmmakers rather than varying aesthetics of 
individual artists. In other words, a formal reading of Propaganda’s provides aesthetic  
the results of the structural and procedural detailing outlined in Chapter 2. My analysis 
will detail what I found to be the most prevalent formal components in Propaganda’s 
videography: lighting, editing, production design, and casting. 
An engagement with Propaganda’s industrial makeup and its formal aesthetics 
begins to account for music video’s and television advertisement’s place in American 
film history. As evidenced by Propaganda’s continued aspirations to be a feature-film 
company, these forms of content were a component of a strategy of placing itself within 
the highly competitive American movie market.14 Certain components of Propaganda’s 
narrative confirm this trajectory, where forms of marketing and branding serve to 
promote multiple agents - from a group of aspiring filmmakers to already established 
companies and recording artists. Propaganda’s work in music videos and television 
advertisements incorporated a cinematic style into broadcasted content. MTV was a large 
part of this melding, but Propaganda’s position as a production company enabled its 
employees to venture out beyond the norms of broadcasted content. Its filmmakers’ 
continued, if varied, success in later decades speaks to the pervasiveness of their 
strikingly visual style.15 Though I am hesitant to proclaim Propaganda’s heavy influence 
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on the American entertainment industry as a whole, it is hard to deny the subsequent rise 
of a “cool cinema” aesthetic of the nineties, as addressed by Perren’s work in Indie Inc., 
namely the American independent cinema lead by filmmakers like Steven Soderbergh, 
Quentin Tarantino, and Spike Lee, where the mixing of marketing, popular music, and 
blockbuster filmmaking enable a divergent modes of franchising.  
Finally, the history of Propaganda Films corresponds to my own personal 
trajectory as fan, scholar, and critic. My fandom stems from not only the pleasure of 
viewing Propaganda’s works but also relating that pleasure to the systems of production 
that shape it. I believe that a deeper understanding of these systems bring insightful depth 
to my own media-watching past. As Matt Hills suggests, academia is “nevertheless 
bounded by its own [certain type of] imagined subjectivity” where perceived values 
indicate a faithfulness deployed by the scholar.16 I trust that my insight can correlate with 
others’ own relationship with popular culture and inspire continued engagement with 
fellow fans and scholars alike in accessing Propaganda’s place in filmed entertainment’s 
own history. My intentions are scholarly, but ultimately subject to personal enthusiasm 
for music and images I hold dear. I hope to share these insights, instilled with my 
fandom, in a comprehensive yet compelling manner. 
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Chapter 1:  
TV in Stereo: MTV as a Site of Convergence 
In fall 1980, 26-year-old Bob Pittman already had some success as a programmer 
for the Warner-Amex Satellite Entertainment Company. Two years prior, Pittman helped 
the newly formed company – a result of American Express buying out half of Warner 
Cable – debut The Movie Channel, a station that utilized the programming and economic 
benefits of feature-film syndication to create a cable channel dedicated to at-home movie 
viewing.1 After The Movie Channel’s initial success, the company wanted to create 
another network with Pittman again overseeing programming. “I had done a TV show on 
NBC called Album Tracks, which ran after Saturday Night Live,” said Pittman in 2010, 
“which played a little bit of music videos, some music news. So I pitched the idea of, 
‘Let’s do a video radio station.’”2  Pittman’s supervisor, John Lack, a former radio 
executive at CBS and a self-identified “major rock ‘n’ roller” loved the idea, and actually 
considered a similar station on his own. Lack backed Pittman, a former radio programmer 
as well, to be a new producer for the channel. Lack agreed that a radio programmer’s 
sensibility would be necessary for this new-look channel.  First, Pittman and Lack had to 
contend with Jack Schneider, CEO of Warner-Amex and former president of CBS. 
Schneider was reluctant to hire Pittman as a programmer citing his limited television 
experience. “They had [CBS television producer] Mike Dann on retainer, so they send 
me to see Mike. Mike interviews me, calls Jack Schneider up, and says, ‘Yes, he can do 
the job. You should hire this kid.’”3 Finally, Schneider agreed to Pittman’s involvement, 
hired him as head-programmer, and the new project was officially underway.  
The next months had Pittman gathering a team of young aspiring broadcasters and 
marketers including John Sykes and Tom Freston, a former ad-man and Epic Records 
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promoter respectively. By December 1980, the team featuring Pittman, Lack, Freston, 
and Sykes was ready to make its proposal to the Warner-Amex board. Though confident, 
they were worried about the board’s most conservative member, Atlanta-bred C.E.O. of 
American Express, James Robinson III. Schneider was an export in dealing with 
executive-types and led off with describing the general concept. Anticipating hesitation 
towards rock-and-roll music programming, the team played the most “plain-vanilla” 
clips4 of music performances, including Olivia Newton-John and Kris Kristofferson. At 
one point, Robinson asked Warner Entertainment CEO Steve Ross about where the 
channel would get this new “music clip” material. “Oh, that’s no problem,” Robinson 
remembers Ross responding. “Every time one of these rock groups creates a new album, 
[record labels] do a video clip and give it away as promotion.” Robinson was thrilled 
about the “no cost” aspect of the deal. “We committed in the first two minutes,” 
Robinson claims. “They had to spend the next 45 convincing their sister company why 
this is a good idea.”5 After some continued reluctance, Steve Ross told a simple anecdote 
about his daughter. “She said I ought to do it, so I’m going to do it.” The channel’s 
financial backing was now secure.  
As the cable launch rapidly approached, the team still was not satisfied with what 
to call the station. The station was referred to as “TVM” initially, but the name still did 
not sit right with Pittman and his crew. Then during one brainstorming session in the 
weeks leading up to the channel’s premiere, music promoter Steve Casey said dryly, 
“How about MTV…doesn’t that sound better [than TVM]?” Though the suggestion was 
not meet with the most enthusiastic response, everyone agreed that even if it did not 
sound much better, it certainly looked better. “So everybody goes, “Yeah, MTV. That 
sounds better!”6 recalled Michael Pittman about the meeting. So TVM quickly 
transformed into MTV, Music Television, just in time for its August 1 debut.  
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MTV AND CONVERGENCE 
 Through relations between multiple industries, MTV became a site indicative of 
convergent trends in the entertainment industry and the new practices such trends 
influenced. This chapter hopes to speak towards scholar John Mundy’s description of the 
development of 20th century media-entertainment as a “managing of tensions” between a 
variety of industrial structures.7 These structures had been long established as commercial 
ventures where capitalistic sentiments have been present for generations.8 The term 
“convergence” has three principal clusters of meaning, according to scholar Graham 
Murdock: convergence of cultural forms, or the‘grand fusion’ of multimedia; 
convergence of communication systems, pertaining to the manipulable utilization of 
media technologies; and convergence of corporate ownership, as an “economic and 
organizational phenomenon recognizable at the level of corporate strategy and 
structure.”9 My research largely pertains towards the third definition of convergence, yet 
the other two are inherently linked to such strategies and practices.  
 Profit has been a fundamental objective for such ventures, and MTV’s own 
development indicates aspirations that seek to achieve initial and continued financial 
success in markets that have previously been delineated. In other words, Warner-Amex 
hoped to tap into the recording industry in order to provide a new from of music 
distribution suitable for its growing need for content. As E. Ann Kaplan describes, such 
commercialism is disguised only to a point. A better name for music videos, for example, 
would be “music promos,” as the invisible authorship of the text - the director, the crew,  
and the record label that produce such content- are similar to the invisible authorship of 
advertising.10 The most apparent promotion is for the recording artist, who hopes to sell 
records and gain a large audience. However, the underlying promotion is for the network, 
record labels, and the content producers behind the content. These varying industries 
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were the beneficiaries of mutual agreements within the MTV network. This chapter 
details these agreements. For Propaganda Films, these benefits would enable a new way 
to enter the industry. For the company’s filmmakers, commercialism was a necessity, not 
an annoyance to overcome.  
 Once such a platform had been established, Propaganda Films could implement 
its own practices of bringing Hollywood sensibilities towards an increasingly visual 
music industry. As the opening anecdote indicates, the cooperation between various 
industries was shaky at best in the beginning. MTV’s cultural prominence, which came 
slowly with continued adjustments in content and distribution, only began to occur when 
such ventures proved to be lucrative. This chapter sets the stage for Propaganda’s 
development and success through MTV’s own tensions with various industries and the 
resulting success from those tensions. Despite these eventual complications, convergence, 
as Henry Jenkins reminds us, “is primarily a technological process with brings together 
multiple media functions within the same devices.”11 In this narrative, the technological 
site for these tensions and evolutions is the television set. This particular technology, 
especially in terms of the mutli-channel transition, saw momentous transformations in on 
many levels, from corporate structures to audience demographics. This chapter ultimately 
argues that MTV was an essential and important site for Propaganda films and filmed 
entertainment as a whole. 
In the late seventies and early eighties, the American entertainment industry was 
evolving rapidly. With cable television ending the paradigm of network television’s hold 
on television, new cable and satellite stations provided a means in which to package and 
distribute new kinds of content for at-home viewing. And in terms of the cooperation 
between multiple media industries, the aforementioned pitch meeting, where Pittman and 
his colleagues had to justify their venture to a company that was the result of a merger 
 18 
between a communications company (Warner Communications) and a financial services 
company (American Express) indicates that shifts had already begun in the industry’s 
corporate structures. Conglomeration increased “the size and the financial, political, and 
market power of a corporation, but does not necessarily reduce competition.”12 New 
corporate conglomerates were continuously making efforts to advance their products and 
services via new technologies and new production methods in a competitive market. 
Companies like Warner Amex felt this change was a necessity. Coca-Cola, in a statement 
made after its purchase of Columbia Pictures in 1982, cited the “significant changes” 
occurring due to the “technological developments which have resulted in the availability 
of alternative forms of leisure time entertainment, including expanded pay and cable 
television, video cassettes, video discs and video games.”13  
Amanda Lotz speaks of the multi-channel transition that began during this period, 
and MTV is a direct result of that transition. Lotz states that new channels “changed the 
competitive dynamics of the industry” and what kinds of programming could be 
produced.14 Audience targeting became more and more narrow with distributors and 
producers looking less and less to appeal to the entire family. Lotz acknowledges how 
diversification could lead to a polarized audience and how these contribute to a variety of 
cultural fissures.15 These fissures occur within television-watching cultures, where the 
medium’s influence on water-cooler conversation becomes diminished by such selective 
practices. Lotz’s ideas are of course important for engaging viewership and communities 
as a whole, but I also argue that these fissures were also present within MTV’s own 
development. It was these divides that gave Michael Pittman and his team difficulties in 
launching the station, because the powers that be in the Warner-Amex board room could 
not relate to the type of entertainment MTV would provide. For them, TV was for a mass 
audience. The idea that a rock and roll music video channel would succeed in a mass 
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communication industry was foreign to them. However, Pittman believed such a platform 
would work to draw new younger audiences. It also generated and developed a then-
infant content form of music videos. This emergence was not instant but timely, and my 
research hopes to detail how music videos on television grew out of these industrial 
developments to become a medium notable enough for Propaganda to rely on. 
 MTV’s first four years as a music video platform saw continued retooling and 
developments on several fronts, including expanding broadcast distribution, growing 
music industry involvement, and more progressive cultural diversity. For future music 
video production companies like Propaganda Films, MTV had to become a cultural staple 
in itself. This talent pool was not simply relegated to what MTV broadcast - musical 
artists performing and showcasing their own products - but also the VJs that tied the 
broadcasted flow together, the filmmakers who produced and directed the music videos, 
and the corporate entities that hoped to promote consumerist practices.  
In the case of major entertainment industries, the hand of industry must always 
guide them even if that guidance is usually itself unsure of the content’s eventual form. 
Even the pre-rock and roll form of classical Hollywood musicals dealt with a desire to 
find the right combination of sound and vision and turn that combination into success. As 
John Mundy wrote in regards to Hollywood at this time, “the successful development of 
the musical genre through the 1930s, and its huge popularity with audiences throughout 
the next two decades, depended precisely on the formal, thematic and ideological fusion 
of spectacle and narrative and on the management of the tensions which result.”16 In other 
words, industry manages the balance in an assortment of conceptual arenas, both formal 
and cultural. Technology is a particular conceptual arena that preceded MTV’s creation, 
as I will discuss in terms of the Qube system’s role in conceptualizing concepts of niche 
programing on cable systems. Popular music was but one form of cultural content ripe 
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enough for television broadcast distribution. Music videos then represent another site of 
this tension.   
Mundy speaks of a relationship between the visual and the audial, an aesthetic 
duality of sight and sound. For music videos, such a simple description would fall 
severely short. When music videos are placed on a broadcast format lke MTV, such 
descriptions fall even shorter. For MTV and similar channels that followed, such as 
Nickelodeon, HBO, and the soon to be debuted Showtime, “the simple and supposed 
identity of forms (such as narrative, advertisement, and news report) and institutional 
oppositions (such as radio and television, program and commercial) are shattered, 
combined, and multiplied to the extent that singular distinctions and binary oppositions 
are rendered multiple and thus irrelevant.”17 While the “dualistic” nature of Mundy’s 
classical Hollywood hopes to make those tensions invisible, music television’s design 
exposes formatting indicative of broadcast media. For Michael Pittman and his producing 
team at MTV, rethinking the music on television model went beyond narrowcasting. It 
re-conceptualized how television was broadcast and received. Pittman suggested this in 
1992: 
We’re now seeing the TV become a component of the stereo system. It’s 
ridiculous to think that you have two forms of entertainment – your stereo and 
your TV – which have nothing to do with one another. What we’re doing is 
marrying those two forms so that they work together in unison. We’re the first 
channel on cable to pioneer this…I think that what we’ve been doing up to now in 
cable has been dealing with forms that have already had some success on TV. 
MTV is the first attempt to make TV a new form, other than video games and data 
channels. We’re talking about creating a new form using existing technologies.18 
For Pittman, MTV was a retooling of the television set itself into a brand new form of a 
tele-aural-visual technology, a realization of television as a form of videography.19 Of 
course, Pittman could easily say this in retrospect. The implications of this shift were 
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nothing but conjecture at the time of MTV’s creation. Pittman and his crew had an idea 
that such a channel may work in this new industrial environment, but to what extent? The 
MTV of 1981 was not the MTV of 1985, let alone 1992. Even music video revolutions 
contain their own re-conceptualizations, reformations, and continued development. Music 
videos did not come to complete fruition on August 1, 1981. Their own cultural and 
aesthetic development had only just begun.  
 The first section of my analysis will focus on the three industries that converged 
through MTV’s broadcast: the cable television industry, the record industry, and the 
advertising industry. Particularly, how these industries had to make accommodations to 
MTV’s distribution strategies. As we will see, these industries had their own hesitance on 
MTV’s broadcast model. These issues stemmed from concerns that were indicative of the 
period, particularly how MTV would curate its content and enable that curation to lead to 
continued financial success. Such issues arose prior to MTV’s first broadcast and 
continued throughout its first years as a regional channel and then a national channel.  
The next section will continue MTV’s narrative from 1981 to 1984. Particularly, I 
will be detailing MTV’s own expansion from suburban and rural markets towards bigger 
metropolitan areas, cementing its stance as the national source for music video content. 
Also, I discuss MTV’s slow turn towards cultural diversification, where there was no 
African American artist’s music video broadcast on the channel in its first couple of 
years. Michael Jackson’s video for “Thriller” broke that barrier, and I will detail that 
video’s production and subsequent success on MTV.  “Thriller” not only stood as a big 
step towards the network’s diversification, but also drastically altered the notion that 
music videos were just visual accompaniment to commercially viable songs. The video’s 
production and content indicated the American film industry’s strong influence on the 
music video medium and also elevated the music video as a viable media-form, 
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beginning the trends towards high-concept genre-driven bits of high-budget filmmaking 
that Propaganda would herald later in the decade. With this history in place, only then 
can we begin to understand Propaganda’s position in this narrative.                                       
The trajectory of music videos on television begins with convergence cultures and 
continues with the constant evolution of media platform and content. MTV’s story 
exemplifies how such developments occur. 
INDUSTRIES ALIGNED  
 For Warner-Amex, the venture into music video programming began with new 
technology’s abilities to expand cable-programming distribution. Broadcast cable 
technologies facilitated a “viewer’s break from the network-era television experience”20 
and gave them increased control of which content he or she engaged. In the late 
seventies, Warner-Amex had been implementing new forms of technology on its own. 
The QUBE system, an early version of a cable guide that utilized hardware instead of 
software, enabled its users not only access to broadcasts of Warner’s library (television 
shows, feature films, etc.) but enabled them to obtain that content on demand.  The 
QUBE’s development also brought hardware and software developers (data processers) 
within cable television’s then growing industry. These new forms of production mixed in 
with more established industries of television broadcasters and record labels. This process 
is then greatly accelerated by the threat of competition in both market and technological 
development. Growth was necessary for continued success and companies with a history 
of independence were willing to partner with each other in order to exploit, as James D. 
Robinson III stated when announcing American Express’ merger with Warners, “a 
compatible extension of our travel and entertainment-related services [that] gives us entry 
into the fast-growing, at home consumer and entertainment industry.”21 With QUBE, 
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Warner Communications had enabled a platform for the transmission of entertainment on 
a larger scale and with unprecedented interactivity. While technology was important to 
give MTV the ability to even be a party of the diversifying broadcast industry, it served 
as a starting point for the industrial changes to come win the next two years. These 
developments would prove to be highly influential for a number of industry’s strategies 
of gaining new forms of profit. However, the new technological developments created 
holes that Warner-Amex hoped to fill within larger scope of cable broadcasting. What 
information to broadcast and for whom? 
A year after its 1977 launch, Warner-Amex had begun developing new forms of 
network entertainment that stemmed from these technological developments. Michael 
Pittman’s success with The Movie Channel utilized Warner’s film library. But even with 
feature films, Pittman produced like a radio programmer. “I programmed The Movie 
Channel like a radio station,” Pittman claimed. “I figured, Okay, these are the five most 
popular movies, I’m gonna show them twice a day. These are not so popular. I’m only 
gonna show them every four days.”22 The large expanse of Western popular music was an 
untapped source for television broadcasting, at least in the 24-hour radio-like stream that 
Pittman and his associates imagined. Popular music had of course had many moments on 
television, from the early broadcasts of Lawrence Welk to Ed Sullivan and Sonny and 
Cher. But unsurprisingly, cable operators were not necessarily concerned with content as 
much as the central aspects of the broadcasting industry: audiences and demographics. 
John Lack detailed the pitch at the aforementioned board meeting in 1980: 
See, the whole pitch to the board directors at WASEC had nothing to do with 
music videos. It had to do with demographics. At that point, there was no 
television aimed at the twelve- to thirty-four-year-old demographic. Half of the 
Saturday Night Live audience was over thirty-five. If you were an advertiser 
buying time on Saturday Night Live to reach young adults, half your money was 
wasted on thirty-five-plus. We said, if this music channel reaches twelve to thirty-
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four year olds, we can deliver an audience for advertisers they can’t get through 
broadcast television. Cable providers would sign up new subscribers, because this 
would be available only on cable. We would sell second-set hookups because 
mothers and fathers would not allow this shit to be played in the living room: 
“Here’s a TV, go play it in your own bedroom!”23   
But such logic still didn’t sit well with the board, who were still skeptical about the 
appeal of the station’s content. Lack would later call the cable operators “pole climbers,” 
men who were engineers first above all else. “They didn’t know original programming,”24 
he would conclude. Andy Orgel, then Vice President for affiliate sales and marketing 
under CEO Jack Schneider conveyed his own experience after the pitch: 
“So,” I said, after I finished my pitch, “what do you think?” And there was total 
silence. Finally, one guy got up and said, “Now, if you sold me a channel of 
country music that really reflects America, I’d put that on—but I’m not going to 
put this on.” Right then, we knew we had our work cut out for us.25 
Pittman, Lack, and their fellow music television heralds needed to prove that such 
content was necessary and warranted towards a cable industry that would much rather 
place another sports channel than something that pertained to rock-and-roll. But even in 
light of this reluctance, the group faced challenges from multiple fronts. Again, an 
assortment of industries needed to align for MTV to transform from a hope to a reality, 
and the reception from one of those industries, the music business, was only slightly 
warmer than their broadcast cable counterparts.  
 In the late 1970s, the recording industry was going through a slump in record 
sales. From 1979 to 1980, sales of recorded music in the US market dropped 10.4%, 
which amounted to a value-based sales drop of 11%.26 Some blamed the disco genre, 
which received a lot of backlash through the “disco sucks” rhetoric that was catching on 
around the country. However, disco was not alone in the expanding popular music 
landscape. New sub-cultures expanded in the 70s and new music styles expanded with it. 
Country & Western, punk rock, fusion jazz, heavy metal, hip-hop, and a number of 
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different forms of electronic music also underwent their own increase in popularity. This 
segmented the market as tastes began to diversify. Music consumers welcomed this trend, 
as did the record companies that increasingly produced and distributed music for niche 
audiences. This is parallel to cable television’s own diversification of content for broader 
audiences, a la the QUBE system’s array of various content. But when market segments 
then became smaller and smaller the profit margins became smaller and smaller with it. A 
system geared towards maximizing profit saw its profit margins decreasing. Thus, record 
industries began a new strategy of reducing the artist roster on major labels and began 
limiting their reach into smaller market samples.27 A&R (Artist and Repertoire), the 
division of a record label that scouts for new artists and oversees an artist’s development, 
began to be outsourced to independent (“indie”) labels. What resulted was a trend that 
would later come to define the 1980s recording industry and the recording industry of 
today: the emergence of pop superstars such as Michael Jackson, Madonna, Prince, Janet 
Jackson, Lionel Ritchie, Bruce Springsteen, and George Michael.  
 For an industry seeking to promote such big-name talents, 1980 appeared to be 
the right time for a network like MTV to come to fruition. Pittman suggested this in a Los 
Angeles Times interview: “Stations are becoming more conservative in their 
programming and people are beginning to look for something fresh,” Pittman stated. 
“We’ll play the hit artists, but we’ll also play the new music.”28 But the record label, 
much like their cable counterparts were not instantly enthusiastic about the prospect of 
increasing the production of “music clips.” Even before MTV was given the green light, 
the record industry was grappling with how to manage this new content form. In 
November 1979, Billboard magazine held the first Video Music Conference in a Los 
Angeles Sheraton-Universal Hotel. At the conference, artists like Todd Rundgren and 
Michael Nesmith screened their own videos, and record labels showed off clips by David 
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Bowie, Meat Loaf, Rod Stewart, and Blondie, whose album Eat to the Beat came with a 
videodisk with videos for every song. John Lack participated in a panel entitled “Video 
Music – Tomorrow Is Here Today,” and expressed his intention to start a twenty-four 
hour video music network for broadcast cable. At the end of Lack’s presentation, which 
he described as “pretty classy and elegant,”29 Sidney Sheinberg – who was then the 
president of MCA – stood up and proclaimed, “We ain’t giving you our fucking music.”30 
These early tensions foreshadowed the hesitance Lack and his team would receive at the 
fabled board meeting in a few months later.  
 Such dramatic backlash stems from the perception that MTV would be getting its 
music videos, thus its primary content, for free. Stan Cornyn, then executive vice 
president of Warner Brothers Records, remembers a visit from Pittman: 
Pittman showed up in my office and said, “Will you make these for us?” 
Meaning, would we spend our money to do their programming. Trying to be a 
good corporate scout, I said, “We are going to get into this”—which meant 
nothing, of course. We did do a little bit, but the people at MTV had a huge sales 
job. When it comes to interest in new technology, the record business finishes just 
ahead of the Amish.31 
However, the often-cited idea that the content was free is only partially correct. Scholar 
R. Serge Denisoff explains the fees in his detailed account of MTV’s corporate structure, 
Inside MTV. “Each clip cost MTV approximately $1,000 to clean up the audio and 
transfer the material to one-inch tape,” Denisoff specifies. “In addition, there was a 14 
cent licensing [mechanical] royalty to be paid to ASCAP or BMI.”32 Thus, MTV’s uses 
of video clips were not completely free, but the costs still were nothing compared to 
production fees. However, Pittman felt that the MTV platform would be perfect to spur 
the increasingly perceived slow-down of the music industry. Television meant exposure – 
visual exposure – for artists to a potentially national audience.  
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 Pittman believed that artists could breakout through MTV as they did on radio in 
decades past. The blueprints for the station’s strategy were laid out in a lengthy 1981 
Billboard interview, where Pittman proclaimed the network would be “as important as 
radio, but more importantly, we are targeting the record buyer.”33 MTV was to be 
broadcast in a stereo-sound transmission. Viewers would be able to hear and see their 
artists in the highest quality format available at the time, 24 hours a day. In addition to 
these video clips, the network would broadcast a variety of special programs, including 
concert films, narrative films, and also air interviews with the industry’s most popular 
stars conducted by a consistent group of attractive and engaging video jockeys, or VJs. 
The flow would enable a synergy of promotion for an industry that was seeking new 
approaches in marketing. In other words, MTV’s producers felt that the channel would be 
able to create never-before-seen efforts in music promotion that would generate buzz for 
artists, encourage continued viewing, and continued buying. The record labels only had 
to buy into this idea and television as a platform for promotion through music videos, a 
platform that only returned mediocre profits in the past.  
 The MTV team’s enthusiasm for their strategies ultimately paid off, and was a 
driving force behind getting record label’s to participate. Then RCA president Bob 
Summer remembered John Lack’s pitch:  
Lack took me to dinner at the Four Season and tried to explain why this was going 
to be so good for us. When you have a good business, and someone proposes to 
change your fundamental marketing tactic, you have to think more than twice. But 
you had the sense that these guys were definitely going to go for it.34  
RCA agreed to the conditions and began to produce music videos for the channel. 
Budgets around $15,000 to $25,000 were common for each video.35 “Everyone played a 
little at first,” stated Summer. “But no one really dove in.”36  Perry Cooper, an Atlantic 
Records executive, was also hesitant despite increasing the productions of video clips, but 
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only because they guaranteed exposure. “We’re in the business of getting artists exposed. 
It wouldn’t help to charge for the clips,” stated Perry Cooper. 37 With the help of his 
reluctant record industry partners, Pittman estimated that MTV would have a 400-clip 
library by the first broadcast.38 However, Pittman still made concessions, such as 
superimposing the name of the artist, song, album, and label at the beginning and end of 
each video to be aired in order for easier audience recognition. Regardless, Pittman and 
his team were grateful for any cooperation from the labels. They only needed the 
advertising industry to do the same. 
 Selling MTV to Madison Avenue met the same reluctant responses as the cable 
and record industries. For advertisers, cable television was a brand new venture. The 
success of a cable channel’s ability to promote products was an untested notion. Arnie 
Semsky, media director at the advertising agency Baiten, Barton, Durstine, & Osborne, 
Inc., told the Wall Street Journal “the execution will determine how well it is received.”39 
Larry Blasius of the same agency recalled that MTV had a “conceptual sales problem 
with clients who still have a problem with rock and roll, similar to the way they felt about 
rock radio when it first emerged. They’d rather not get involved.”40 The American 
advertising industry, as it was in 1980 and still is now, was beginning to be obsessed with 
market segmentation, but the traditions of a youth-oriented rock and roll culture still 
discouraged the established and influential moguls on Madison Avenue to take part in 
this risky venture. In essence, the hesitance towards MTV as a viable platform for 
promotion became a capitalistic catch-22. In order for MTV to obtain support from the 
advertising industry, they needed convey that they had a proven and consistent means in 
which to reach a wide audience.  But in order to have that reach, MTV needed the 
support of advertisers to provide revenue for such consistency and growth. Thus, cable 
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broadcasters needed to sell a concept and hope that viewers would buy into it. Pittman 
and his team were convinced that young music listeners would turn into music watchers.  
 Cooperation from the advertising community was essential, as the channel relied 
on advertisers for revenue. The first big pitch to the community was made at the cable 
broadcast convention in New York City in the spring of 1981, where various new 
channels would pitch to major advertising agencies in order to garner support. Pittman 
contacted Fred Seibert, a Grammy-nominated jazz producer who worked for The Movie 
Channel after his own radio career. For his pitch, he decided to produce a three-minute 
filmed presentation to sell the network. “I didn’t have a clue how to make a three-minute 
tape,”41 remembered Alan Goodman, a fellow MTV producer who had been an ad 
copywriter at CBS records. Seibert built the three-minute presentation out of slides and a 
number of music clips. He also added an announcer’s track that was recorded in stereo 
sound to preview the channel’s stereo-sound broadcast. For a convention that featured 
dozens of dull presentations, MTV’s pitch stood out both visually and sonically with the 
help of a large screen and a set of high-quality speakers. “There were people, honest to 
God, dancing,” remembers MTV’s head of sales and marketing, Bob McGroarty. “I 
thought, Holy Christ! This is bigger than I ever imagined.”42 
 In 1981, the thirty-second advertising rate for a cable broadcast was $1,200. 
MTV’s spots were actually selling for $350 and $650, and only 30% of the station’s 
commercial time had been sold to a meager thirteen sponsors. “We finally persuaded 
thirteen hardy souls to come with us. We offered to do their commercials for them, which 
pissed off the ad agencies,” Bob McGroarty stated in 1988.43 The most active buyers 
came from the Hollywood film studios, which knew of the importance of the youth 
demographic. Avco-Embassy, Filmways, United Artists, Universal Pictures, Dolby 
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Laboratories, Pepsico, 7-Up, and the United States Navy agreed to be original time 
buyers.  
 MTV’s association with big-brands brought about a new look towards television 
advertising, where the provocative and stylistic nature music videos became a staple of 
mid to late eighties promotional material. MTV became strict about the direct 
connections between the two. In later years, Propaganda filmmakers would encounter 
these limitations due to commercial obligations:  
Well the first problem was that there was a Coke machine in some of the stock 
footage that we used. So they refused to play it because it had a Coke machine. 
They could see the Coke logo. So we painted out the Coke logo. At the time it 
was very expensive. Then they saw something else they didn’t like, so we took 
that out. 
Then as now, MTV holds a partnership with PepsiCola for cross-promotional 
advertising.44 Pop superstars like Madonna, Lionel Ritchie, and Michael Jackson all had 
endorsement deals with Pepsi and starred in high-budget commercials featuring their 
latest hits. The pop-centric ads worked well in MTV’s own pop-centric broadcasted flow. 
This corporate presence is indicative of what Raymond Williams cited as a “counter-
revolution” in which conglomerate ventures have a certain reach into our lives, where 
choice only becomes limited between “programmed possibilities.”45 The relation between 
music video and television advertisement, a similarity scholar E. Ann Kaplan noted in 
198746, becomes almost invisible in the cross-promotional marketplace of soft drink and 
pop star. I highlight this case only as an example of how MTV proved beneficial for 
national brands as well as the recording artist. This convergent make-up would prove 
useful for Propaganda’s filmmakers later, as they became drawn to the lucrative 
advertising business, an industry Propaganda increasingly became involved with in the 
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1990s. Propaganda upheld its conceptual namesake eagerly and consistently because of 
these corporate relations.  
 Financial backers from the cable industry, the record industry, and Madison 
Avenue were as uncertain about MTV’s success as MTV’s own producers. Only the 
history of radio broadcasting really gave any indication for such a format’s success; if it 
could work audibly for radio, why could it not work visually for television? Also, market 
segmentation would benefit the station. As detailed by Pittman, Lack, and their 
colleagues, demographics were key for MTV, as they believed that the station would 
attract the 12 to 35-year-olds that both networks and cable operators were eager to attract. 
This emphasis on demographics indicates a broad theme in promoting and distributing 
popular music throughout the 20th and into the 21st century: the continual reluctance of 
established media organizations to appease and adhere to the tastes and cultures of 
American youth and the failure to see that population, at least in hindsight, as a viable 
source for consistent consumption. For Pittman and his team at MTV, their task was to 
remind media industries of this viable audience. MTV then becomes not only a site for 
the convergence of three formally self-contained industries, but also a site for the cultural 
and industrial development of media viewing practices. Despite the excitement of seeing 
a year-plus worth of coercing and selling become a reality, Pittman and his team 
continued to reshape their venture and slowly transform MTV into something more than 
a commercially successful venture but a cultural milestone in itself. 
MTV COMING ONTO ITS OWN  
  Midnight on August 1 1981 brought simultaneious excitement and relief for the 
MTV producers and production crew. Months of preparation, industry wrangling, and 
content gathering was finally going to pay off with MTV’s premiere, for better or worse. 
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The broadcast began with the now-iconic astronaut launching off into space and planting 
his multi-colored MTV flag on the moon’s surface. Then the image dissolved to John 
Lack himself, who began by welcoming viewers to the new form of television:  
This is it. Welcome to MTV music television. The world’s first 24 hour stereo-
video music channel. Just moments ago, all of the VJs and crew here at MTV 
collectively hit our executive producer Sue Steinberg over the head with a bottle 
of champagne and behold…a new concept was born. The best of TV combined 
with the best of radio. And starting right now, you’ll never look at music the same 
way again.47 
The copywriters for the first broadcast foregrounded MTV’s convergent nature: a 
television station that acts like a radio, a new form of visual music entertainment. The 
VJ’s would introduce videos new and old, bridging the gap between songs and 
introducing video segments. This is similar duty to the radio DJ: to guide 
viewers/listeners through the current trends in pop music. Much like a museum tour 
guide, VJs would lead consumers through MTV’s music video collection and highlight 
and tout pieces that were new and noteworthy. The first video aired was The Bungle’s 
“Video Killed the Radio Star.” The reason for the song’s choice was obvious to MTV’s 
producers and their audience. 
 Remarkably, that initial audience was not in New York City where the channel 
was being filmed and broadcasted. At the time of MTV’s debut, no Manhattan cable 
operator agreed to carry the channel. In fact, MTV’s first few months on the air failed to 
reach a large market outside of Columbus, Ohio, home of the QUBE system. At the time, 
most cable broadcasts were in the suburbs or rural areas. MTV employees not involved 
with the actual broadcast bused across the George Washington Bridge over to Fort Lee, 
New Jersey, the nearest location where the signal was available. There, the group rented 
out the basement of a small bar and set up half-a-dozen TVs in order to watch. There 
were no advertisers present and only one cable operator showed up – the local from New 
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Jersey who was also the first who agreed to carry the station. The broadcast itself was 
also a disaster. VJ segments aired out of order and the broadcast stream was awkwardly 
edited. “The VJs would announce, ‘That was Styx,’ right after we’d played REO 
Speedwagon. They’d say ‘This is The Who,’ and a .38 Special video would begin,” 
remembers Pittman of that celebratory but stressful first broadcast. “Everything that 
could have gone wrong did go wrong. It was probably one of the worst nights in my life. 
While everyone was celebrating, I was on a telephone with the network operations center, 
going ballistic.”48  
 Reviews of the first broadcast were cautiously optimistic, but cited the limited 
reach of MTV’s broadcast. In the Los Angeles Times, Bob Hilburn wrote, “MTV’s 
campaign won’t be known for weeks, maybe months.”49 Cablevision, a major CATV 
trade publication, was generally enthusiastic about the concept when reviewer Robert 
DiMatteo stated, “the channel is a bold example of the cable industry’s move toward 
specialized audience programming.”50 Advertising Age, in light of the network’s 
shortcoming in ad sales, displayed caution, leading with the headline: “MTV Sells 30%.” 
The article itself had cautious applause like other trade publications, since MTV had yet 
to prove itself to the industry. Outside of the L.A. Times and trade publications like 
Advertising Age, the network received little coverage. The New York Times failed to 
report anything about the advent of the station and its initial launch. With the Times 
absence and no broadcast for New York City, MTV had little pull in the area. MTV 
executive Jack Schneider took notice: “We were stunned, hurt, and angry…I wanted to 
shake them and say ‘Pay attention, we’re doing something here that’s significant.’ But 
their reaction was ‘yawn.’”51  
 The next year saw MTV’s unique platform for music video content slowly begin 
to pay off. The record industry began utilizing MTV as a viable resource that influenced 
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record sales. In MTV’s first couple of years, the majority of music video content came 
from Australia and Europe, as labels were more willing to utilize smaller budget foreign 
artist. “We had been asking the record companies to produce videos with no guarantee of 
success, so we’d been left with groups like Adam Ant that no one else had,” recalls 
McGroarty. “But all of a sudden people were coming into record stores and saying, ‘I 
want Adam Ant’s new album.’”52 Records began selling in cities without having had any 
airplay, and this random spike of sales was quickly attributed to that artist’s presence on 
MTV. “The pressure from artists and managers was awful,” recalled Lenny Waronker, 
then president of Warner Bros. Records. “Everybody wanted to do a video. You had to 
get on. The kids would hang around late at night to watch.” By the end of 1982, large 
labels like Warner Bros. Records, Arista, and RCA began to admit that MTV did in fact 
have an effect on sales. Perhaps the ultimate validation was the September 1982 issue of 
Billboard. The magazine conducted a survey of retailers from cities around the nation. 
The headline read: “Survey Finds MTV Strongly Affecting Record Sales.” Some retailers 
claimed they had to request records they never heard of before. “It seems to spur sales of 
obscure groups, and it helps because radio stations won’t play new artists,” one retailer 
claimed. 53 MTV and cable systems in general improved on targeting, as advertisers could 
preselect demographic characteristics. Advertising budgets could be spent accordingly 
and effectively in order to reach a particular market, such as the 14 to 24 year-old 
demographic.54 MTV thus became a surefire means of reaching a young audience.  
 With growing attention from the record labels, cable and advertising followed 
suit. MTV began tweaking the channel in response. Producers rebuilt the original MTV 
studio set and altered some formal elements, such as dimming the lighting and quicker 
editing between segments. Also, the network started producing promotional spots using 
rock and roll’s elite to promote MTV’s expansion into new markets outside of the 
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Midwest such as New York City, which still did not carry the channel still one year after 
it was first broadcasted. “America, demand your MTV! Call your cable operator now. 
Call him and say ‘I want my MTV!’” proclaims a wide-eyed Pete Townshend, lead 
guitarist for The Who, in one spot. The various artists were called in on a volunteer basis 
and included, Adam Ant, John Cougar Mellancamp, Pat Benatar, Stevie Nicks, Hall and 
Oates, David Bowie, Peter Wolf, Sting, Rick Ocasek, and others. Denise Bozi, the 
promotion manager at Manhattan cable called the promotion “brilliant” as it illustrated 
MTV as a viable means to bring in the biggest artists and showcase new talent.55 In May 
1983, Pittman also appeared before the prestigious National Academy for Television 
Arts, and Sciences heralding MTV’s success: “There will be about 20 million pay 
subscribers by the end of the year, and we project that by 1985 there will be 45 million 
pay subscribers…benefits will be dramatic.”56 Between the in your face advertising 
campaign and Pittman’s continual attempt at getting cable operators to finally admit to 
MTV’s viability, the promotions paid off. Beginning in September 1982, Manhattan 
Cable began broadcasting MTV. The network now had 6.75 million hookups throughout 
the nation.  
 Cultural critics, however, began to cry foul about MTV’s music video selection. 
“MTV was racist,” recording artist Joe Jackson once claimed.57 Such a blunt statement 
was somewhat validated in light of MTV’s video selections. In the first two years of 
broadcasting, MTV rarely played music videos by black artists. Bob Pittman and Les 
Garland defended their policy by saying that black artists were not excluded because of 
race but due to their musical stylings. For Pittman, if it was not rock and roll or new wave 
oriented it was not suitable for the network. MTV executive were quick to come to the 
channel’s defense“The worst thing was that ‘racism’ bullshit,” stated Les Garland. 
“There were artist of color on MTV: Joan Armatrading, Eddy Grant, the Busy Boys, even 
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Prince. But there were hardly any videos being made by black artists. Record companies 
weren’t funding them. They never got accused of racism.”58 Bob Pittman’s desire for a 
rock and roll format met with disapproval from inside MTV as well. Carolyn Baker, an 
MTV executive, remembers telling Pittman “We’ve got to play James Brown.” Pittman 
cited network research, which said “our audience thinks rock and roll started with the 
Beatles.” The belief was that white suburbanites, who were the vast majority of those 
who watched cable, would not be receptive to pop, R&B, or funk genres.  
 Pittman would be proven wrong in 1983. Pop superstar Michael Jackson had 
released his album Thriller in late-November 1982. It was a gigantic success for the artist 
and his label Epic Records, selling $1 million in sales per week at its peak.59 Michael 
Jackson was the quintessential artist in the recording industry’s superstar blockbuster 
strategy that emerged after the late 70s recording industry slump. Labels released fewer 
albums but with greater budgets, creating a blockbuster mentally for their biggest artists. 
“Astronomically high, non-refundable advances, huge marketing budgets, including 
expensive music video productions, vast tour expenses etc. had driven production and 
marketing budgets to unprecedented heights,” wrote music business researcher Peter 
Tschmuck.60  
 Jackson had had some success with music videos for the singles “Beat It” and 
“Billie Jean,” but the album sales began to decline in the summer of 1983. Jackson 
wanted to make a “short film” to accompany the title-track single and perhaps boost sales 
again. “We’re trying to bring back the motion picture shorts,” Jackson said. “And I 
wanted “Thriller” and “Beat It” to be a stimulant for people to make better videos or short 
films.” Jackson’s influence for his short film came from Hollywood horror films. Jackson 
spoke about watching one film from 1981:  
 37 
I watched American Werewolf in London. We really really liked it, because it was 
a different type of horror movie, it was comedy and horror. Well, that’s the way I 
see it. And I said, ‘Who’s the director that did it?’ and they said it was John 
Landis. I said, “Great, we need to get in touch with him.”61 
Landis was intrigued by the proposition:  
 
“I didn’t know the song, but I knew the album, and I knew ‘Beat It’ and ‘Billie 
Jean.’ Bob Giraldi directed “Beat It” and “Beat It” is genuinely good.  But the 
idea of making short little songs doesn’t interest me at all. So, I said to Michael, 
“Listen Michael, I’d love to make something more elaborate,” which Michael 
picked up on because that’s what he wanted to do. His whole thing was it’s gotta 
be good, it’s gotta be great, it’s gotta be big. The best.62 
With a half-a-million dollar budget from Epic (and Jackson’s own personal 
investments)63, Jackson and Landis decided to work together and try to create the most 
elaborate music video yet. Hiring industry make-up legend Rick Baker to design 
Jackson’s werewolf and zombie outfits, the scale of the production seemed akin to a 
Hollywood feature film.  Due to massive lead-up promotion by both Epic Records and 
MTV, there was a large audience eagerly awaiting its premiere on the cable network on 
December 2, 1982.  
 For the video, Les Garland stated that the network settled on a saturation strategy 
he described as “‘Every time we play “Thriller,” let’s tell them when we are going to play 
it again,’ We played it three to five times a day. We were getting audience ratings 10 
times the usual when we broadcast ‘Thriller.’“64 The video also influenced an increased 
black artist presence on the channel, diversifying its content and setting up a precedent 
for future programs like Yo! MTV Raps to premiere at the end of the decade. The 
industrial implications of the “Thriller” video’s success were quickly apparent. “The big 
turning point was ‘Thriller.’“claimed music video director Briant Grant. “As soon as the 
American [film industry] got involved, things became monetized turning music videos 
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into a proper industry, which operated alongside MTV.”65 Both budgets and expectations 
grew for the music videos after “Thriller,” and the industry has not looked back since. 
CONCLUSION 
 By 1984, MTV’s prevalence in the American media-scape was solidified. Both 
Rolling Stone and Time had cover stories about the channel and the rising success of 
music videos. The year is also when MTV aired its first Music Video Awards featuring 
Madonna and her infamous pointed brassiere. Though the criticisms still continue in 
regards to the network’s handling of its content and its dabbling with “low-culture” 
tropes, the discourse surrounding music videos and their various platforms have fully 
come onto their own. The “Thriller” music video proved that the station had dramatic 
power over record sales, especially if music video budgets continued to grow. Perhaps 
the new and growing relation between music videos and Hollywood was a natural one, as 
production systems were firmly in place and directors could experiment and showcase 
their capabilities in this new medium. Also, MTV provided a dependable means in which 
to get these filmmakers’ works seen consistently. The youth market was growing 
accustomed to MTV’s presence, and often first looks at new pop artists were on the 
channel. Even if they did not realize it at the time, MTV’s audience was also seeing the 
emergence of a growing number of music video filmmakers. Propaganda would become 
the center of this new community 
 Hopeful filmmakers, particularly the soon-to-be Propaganda founders like David 
Fincher, Dominic Sena, and Nigel Dick, had a new means of which to enter the industry 
and make a name for themselves. A young and eager group of men - Hollywood hopefuls 
themselves – felt that their collective determination could lead towards success in the 
field. MTV became a necessary and pivotal component for this field to flourish. Without 
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such a platform, Propaganda would not have been so eager to take the risk in starting the 
venture. Extending these trends into television advertising would prove a beneficial 
approach towards making a name for themselves as filmmakers of high-concept stylistic 
promotional material. Their own particular form of music video aesthetics, which I detail 
in chapter three, would fit perfectly on the station that already made a name for itself 
kinetically showcasing a visual style of music on television.  
 By 1985, with three years of proven success, cultural relevance, and a growing 
audience, the stage was set for Propaganda’s establishment. The initially skeptical 
beginnings of a “video-radio” station had grown into a new form of television. 
Propaganda’s founders understood how it was an opportune time to own-up towards their 
commercial and aesthetic aspirations to create a space for innovation and financial 
succes. It only took a little collaboration and a lot of conceptualizing to make those 
aspirations a reality. They only had to put themselves out there. 
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Chapter 2: 
Selling Propaganda: Propaganda Films, 1986 - 1991 
By the middle of the 1980s, music videos, with the help of MTV’s growing 
popularity, became an established and familiar form of filmed entertainment. Their 
cultural appeal was also met with financial success. The era’s biggest stars became even 
bigger because of their music videos. MTV began to lose its claim as the sole source for 
music video content on television, as competition grew and other video channels were 
established. On March 5, 1983, Glenn D. Daniels launched Country Music Television 
from his production facility, Video World Productions, in Henderson, Tennessee. The 
channel catered to a large country music fan base that was eager for a visual 
accompaniment for their beloved music. More forms of music were now getting their 
visual due through these new broadcast niche platforms. In August 1984, Canadian media 
company CHUM launched the MuchMusic channel, which played music-related 
programs throughout the day, with other forms of programming – game shows, sitcoms, 
and infomercials – at night. On New Years Day, 1985, MTV itself launched another 
network, Video Hits One, or VH1, in order to showcase the softer and lighter side of 
mainstream popular music, a refuge for the older music video viewer consumer to limit 
the loud, sex-driven, and raucous programming of MTV and its rock and roll vibe. Rather 
than new wave, pop, and rock stars, VH1 played music by Tina Turner, Kenny Rogers, 
Carly Simon, Elton John, and Billy Joel - an older breed of rock star for an older 
demographic.1 
On September 4, 1984, MTV aired its first Video Music Awards, which honored 
the best music videos from that previous year. The ceremony was held at New York 
City’s famous Radio City Music Hall with Dan Akroyd and Bette Midler hosting. During 
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the ceremony, Madonna performed “Like a Virgin” wearing her fabled pointed brassiere 
and wedding gown, ushering yet another new form of music on television: the award 
show performance, which has still remained another way for pop stars to market their 
newest singles and remind audiences of their provocative appeal through live 
performance. The Cars’ video for their song “You Might Think” won the first ever Video 
of the Year award, and Herbie Hancock took the most trophies home with five for the 
video for his crossover hit “Rockit.”2 At another ceremony that year, the Grammys, the 
award for Best Music Video, Short Form, which was given for the first time, went to 
Duran Duran for “Girls on Film/Hungry Like the Wolf.” Award shows like the VMAs 
and the Grammys provided yet another way for popular music to reach audiences through 
television broadcasts in order to promote artists and their records. In other words, these 
shows were advertisements in themselves, a method of giving critical and cultural 
validity to music videos through awards and recognition.3  
As discussed in the previous chapter, music videos and their distribution 
platforms, particularly those of the 1980s, stand as a result of media industries 
undergoing convergent transformations. These transformations went beyond the music 
video production business and indicated new trends of American media-making as 
market segmentation diversified broadcast content. By 1986, music videos became “a 
form of video (and cultural) production whose surface of sights and sounds, imagery and 
music, has transformed and reorganized the limits of television and music, film and 
video, advertising, and fashion.”4 This new diversification was apparent to a group of 
filmmakers - Steve Golin, Jani Sighvatsson, Monty Montgomery, Nigel Dick, Dominic 
Sena, and David Fincher - who in 1986, founded Propaganda Films, a production 
company that would utilize music videos and television commercials to promote their 
filmmaking talent and sell the services of Propaganda Films, its employees, and their 
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various clients. Some of the biggest stars in the music industry utilized Propaganda for 
their music videos, including Madonna, Paula Abdul, Janet Jackson, Guns N’ Roses, 
Steve Winwood, and Billy Idol. 
So why detail Propaganda Films’ formative years as a case study? The first reason 
for my focus is straightforward: Propaganda’s narrative and role in American 
entertainment industries is remarkably absent from scholarly discourse. Its absence has 
proved a challenge for my own research, as sources are significantly lacking. Budgets, 
finances, organizational structures, and employee list are currently lost, and the only 
members with access to such information have been unwilling to participate in my study. 
I am aware of these shortcomings, and understand my study’s limited perspective without 
them. Nonetheless, my hope is to at least chronicle this narrative and provide incentive 
for myself (and hopefully others) to continue in engaging this organization’s history. 
Included in my study are interviews with a few Propaganda employees I have conducted. 
These interviews help illustrate how such a company was managed, how it operated, and 
what social dynamics were in play.  
Scholarly discussions about music videos focus on two particular aspects of music 
video history: 1) attempting to define and delineate music videos as a unique art form 
and/or 2) the significance of MTV as a paradigm-shifting media platform. While I do find 
these discussions highly warranted, my personal aim is to go beyond such discourse and 
approach the medium with new lines of inquiry. Who made music videos? Why? How 
were they made? Were their productions different than other forms of filmed 
entertainment? What approach and perspectives did these filmmakers have on this form 
of content? I believe Propaganda Films is an excellent place to begin answering such 
questions, and I hope to provide some insight in light of this absence. 
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The second reason is that Propaganda was the most successful music video and 
commercial production company of the late eighties and spurred further success for its 
filmmakers in Hollywood. After David Lynch won the Palme d’Or for Wild at Heart 
(1990), a project that Steve Golin and Propaganda shepherded and financed, the 
production company began shifting its focus on feature films, which included producing 
more works by David Lynch and other films by Jane Campion and Spike Jonze. Dominic 
Sena would go on to direct mainstream studio films such as Gone in 60 Seconds (2000) 
and Swordfish (2001). Nigel Dick would continue to direct videos for the next 20 years 
after his departure from the company in 1994, including Britney Spear’s video for “Hit 
Me Baby One More Time” and Cher’s “Believe.” David Fincher’s success has been the 
most notable, with a number of critical and commercial hits including Seven (1995), 
Fight Club (1999), The Curious Case of Benjamin Button (2008), and The Girl With the 
Dragon Tattoo (2011). Propaganda Films thus acted as an incubator for some of 
Hollywood’s best talent. My study accounts for how such a platform could lead to this 
notoriety and provide a glimpse of their early careers, a history that has been curiously 
neglected in the academy and in the trade press.  
Third, I argue that Propaganda Films echoed MTV’s narrative as a site of media 
convergence. Propaganda’s formation was a result of the continued need for new content 
in a variety of forms. MTV had not only provided a marketable platform for recording 
artists, but the visuals, sounds, and the kinetic pacing of its music videos had begun to 
influence other forms of content as well. Hollywood’s major film studios built lucrative 
connections between filmed entertainment and pop music. Films like Flashdance (1983) 
and Top Gun (1986) showcased music-video like segments and even had their own cross 
promotions with recording artists utilizing music videos that contained clips from the 
films.5 The connection was natural as “it didn’t take a fortuneteller to see the obvious 
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connections [between film and popular music], considering that the youth audience had 
been a vital demographic for Hollywood film for decades.”6 As head of Columbia Music 
Richard Gold claimed, “The Target audience for MTV is the same target for pictures. 
You need the 12 to 25 demographic.”7  
Scholar Sarah Benet-Weiser’s discussion of branding’s relation to audience 
applies to music videos discourse. The niche marketing that platforms like MTV 
provided was “in part about recognizing communities, but at the same time, niche 
marketing reified identities into market categories.”8 “Counterculture,” which was often 
showcased in Propaganda’s corporate strategy and produced content as means to 
differentiate themselves from the perceived status-quo, also served as a way to reach 
niche markets. Gary Cross points out that counter-culturalists became rebels through 
consumption and that the “counter” in culture was very much within the confines of 
consumerism. For Cross, “counterculture was a movement deeply entrenched in 
materialist society and was “intensely entrepreneurial.”9 Propaganda’s company name 
implies the company’s awareness of these “materialistic” ventures in the counter-culture 
of music video production. By differentiating themselves from other Hollywood 
production companies, Propaganda utilized this counter-culture consumerism as a means 
to de-marginalize their position in the film industry in order to eventually join it. Much 
like howHollywood incorporated music video elements into its own productions to jive 
with the period’s trends, Propaganda fully welcomed alternative stylings into their 
production repertoire. Propaganda’s atypical make-up as a purely music video and 
television advertisement company was beneficial, as their acceptance and celebration of 
niche industrial markets enabled them to anticipate American media’s continued 
diversification in the next decade. Propaganda stands as an early purveyor of the multi-
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platform production company that saw cinema as only one method of promoting their 
talented employees and innovative work.  
Such trends inevitably altered Hollywood’s own marketing techniques, as big-
budget Hollywood blockbusters continuously used the stylizations and rhythms of music 
videos in their own narratives (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of music video 
style). This dynamic relationship was beneficial for both industries, as music videos were 
often used for a film’s promotion. As Barbara Klinger comments, the “promotional 
apparatus of a film tends to multiply the meanings from the text in order to increase an 
audience base.”10 Justin Wyatt speaks of music videos as “raiding the text” and 
expanding the film beyond itself and into other content forms.11 However, my aims are 
not to place music videos, commercials, and Propaganda Films itself under the umbrella 
of Hollywood and feature-filmmaking promotion. Rather, I hope to blur the lines between 
these different arenas and continue to detail how different content forms had a hand in 
shaping Propaganda’s productions and the company itself. For Propaganda, music videos 
and television advertisements were a particular type of art form that held their own 
aesthetic qualities. Granted, these qualities would be used for promotional purposes as 
well, for both the artist and the company. Again, in an age where synergies reigned 
supreme for successful and diverse examples of filmed entertainment, Propaganda serves 
as an excellent way to engage the notable trends of this period in American popular 
culture and its various industries.  
The present chapter details Propaganda Films’ story as a means to engage music 
video and commercial productions and their place within a broader American 
entertainment industry. Particularly, I’ll be focusing on Propaganda’s first five years as a 
company, from its founding in 1986 to 1991. There are a couple of reasons for this 
bracketing. In 1991, Polygram acquired Propaganda and folded it into their studio, 
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Polygram Filmed Entertainment, ending an era of independence. Propaganda did 
ultimately benefit from the deal, which gave them access to around $40 million and 
enabled them to compete more directly with Hollywood studios.12 Prior to the 
acquisition, Propaganda’s key filmmakers – Steve Golin, Jani Sighvatsson, Dominic 
Sena, Monty Montgomery, Nigel Dick, Greg Gold, and David Fincher – attempted to 
develop a creative arena in which the group’s talent and professional capabilities could be 
showcased to the industry through the completion of a large number of projects, 
principally music videos and television advertisements. I argue that this period of 
independence is what makes Propaganda’s position in the American film industry 
notable, as the filmmakers were able to corral their own tastes and products within the 
company’s framework and utilize those attributes in order to support the company and its 
“brand.” From a scholarly perspective, the second reason is more practical. In the first 
five years of Propaganda’s existence, the studio was amazingly prolific, producing and 
distributing hundreds of music videos and commercials. Some estimates in the trade 
press, though ultimately unverified, claimed that Propaganda was responsible for a third 
of all music videos being made.13 I argue this period is the most indicative of 
Propaganda’s early corporate strategies and correlates well with the scope of my thesis. 
Hopefully future endeavors could continue Propaganda’s historical narrative past this 
period and until its end in 2000, completing its story.  
The following analysis consists of three sections. The first details the careers of 
Propaganda filmmakers prior to Propaganda’s formation in the fall of 1986. These 
individual’s earlier history speaks towards the ways filmmakers engaged with both music 
video and commercial work and how their professional drive led to more opportunities 
within the recording and advertising industries. The combination of factors preceded the 
company’s founding – such as early experiences in music video and television 
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advertisement filmmaking, dissatisfaction with their production houses, and their own 
professional aspiration to take part in more substantial high-budget productions. These 
factors would encourage the decision to begin a new company that could cater to their 
eclectic practices and strong independent streaks. 
The subsequent section charts the first three years of Propaganda’s existence, 
when industry connections allowed them to consistently be commissioned to produce or 
direct music videos and commercials. This enabled Propaganda to generate striking and 
consistently viable work. I also discuss the relation between the six founding Propaganda 
filmmakers – Steve Golin, Jani Sighvatsson, Nigel Dick, Dominic Sena, Greg Gold and 
David Fincher – working with each other and within the company as a whole. While the 
word “collective” has been thrown around multiple times in a variety of interviews with 
members of the group, I hope to clarify how much or how little Propaganda’s production 
practices corresponded with this touted collaboration. Often these outspoken ideals differ 
from actual practice.  
The third section looks at the production processes for music videos and 
commercials. This includes a detailed account of the production of Nigel Dick’s 
“Welcome to the Jungle” video in the fall of 1987, which would become the MTV’s most 
requested video. Guns N’ Roses, who had become popular with singles “Welcome to the 
Jungle” and “Sweet Child of Mine” from their album Appetite for Destruction, were just 
one of many top pop artists utilizing Propaganda’s talents. As I establish, the connections 
between Propaganda and their musical artists were interpersonal and casual in nature. 
The production of the “Welcome to the Jungle” was deeply rooted in practicality and 
efficiency, where a quick turnaround was essential for both Nigel Dick the director and 
Guns N’ Roses the band. MTV’s censorship is also an indication that Propaganda’s 
content was still at the mercy of established industries. I end this section with a brief 
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discussion of the differences between music video and commercial production, where the 
shorter form of television advertisements were often marred by the lengthy process of 
exhaustive branding and the more corporate clientele. Commercials also provided 
financial incentives. The advertising industry was eager and willing to work with 
Propaganda’s directors. Productions differed from music videos in that they often were 
longer to complete and included the input of advertising creatives and their brand clients. 
More importantly for Propaganda’s filmmakers, they were often more lucrative ventures 
than music videos. Commercials provided another type of content through which the 
company’s filmmakers could showcase their talent. 
I conclude this chapter with Propaganda’s sale to Polygram Filmed Entertainment 
and the success of David Lynch’s Wild at Heart, which enabled Steve Golin to produce 
high-quality independent feature films. This transition period for the company would 
mark the beginning of the end of Propaganda’s independence from other media-
producers. This acquisition was a source of conflict between the filmmakers, as the 
proclaimed haven for directors – a site for filmmakers to work on the projects they 
wanted in the way they wanted – was also framed by a growing corporate interest. 
PRE-PROPAGANDA AND FOUNDING A MUSIC VIDEO/COMMERCIAL POWERHOUSE 
In the fall of 1985, director Nigel Dick, who at the time lived in the United 
Kingdom, was on location in Los Angeles shooting Tears for Fears’ “Everybody Wants 
to Rule the World” music video, one of three videos he would direct for their album 
Songs From the Big Chair. While staying in Los Angeles, Dick met Steve Golin, who 
was producing music videos for Mark Friedman Productions. Golin approached Dick 
about an opportunity to work in the United States. “Steve said, ‘If you come to LA, I can 
get you work,’” remembers Dick about the meeting. 14  Dick was enticed by the offer, 
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even if it meant relocating his work to a different continent. Prior to Golin’s offer, Dick 
had already made a name for himself in the UK as a music video director for Stiff 
Records. As mentioned earlier, labels in Europe exported their videos to the US as a 
relatively cheap means of international promotion, at least compared to the costs of 
touring. At Stiff Records, Nigel Dick directed his first music video in 1983 for John 
Lewie’s song “I’ll Think I’ll Get My Haircut.” This was the start of his career at Stiff 
Records and later Phonogram Records, which had merged with Polydoor records in 1972 
to create PolyGram. At PolyGram, Dick worked on a number of videos including “Do 
They Know It’s Christmas?” by the supergroup Band Aid, “Things Can Only Get Better” 
by Howard Jones, and the songs from Tears For Fears from Songs From the Big Chair.  
“The production on [“Everybody Wants to Rule the World”] was in fact so 
cataclysmically bad that I figured that Steve and [the rest of Propaganda’s founders] 
could only improve on what had been an awful experience and that, if I ever returned to 
LA, I would want to work with him.”15  
Steve Golin, who came to Los Angeles in 1981 to attend the producer’s program 
at the American Film Institute, had been working at Mark Friedman productions 
producing music videos and straight-to-video content, capitalizing on the home video 
boom of the time. He and a fellow classmate at AFI, an Icelander named Jani 
Sighvatsson, had became line producers for low-budget films. “That was an interesting 
period of time because it was the early stages of the home-video business,” said Golin in 
2013. “We’d make movies for three or four hundred thousand dollars a movie and the 
movies would be distributed to home video and exploited that way.”16  Though producing 
partners, Golin and Sighvatsson worked at different companies, Mark Friedman 
Productions and N. Lee Lacy respectively. With Sighvatsson at N. Lee Lacy, a 
commercial production company, were directors Dominic Sena and Greg Gold. Also, 
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Steve invited his good friend and fellow producer Monty Montgomery to be a part of the 
group. Nigel Dick had worked with Golin, Gold, and Sena in the past when he had 
commissioned them to work music video productions during his tenure at Phonograph.  
All of the men were not satisfied with their current positions, and wanted to start their 
own venture. Dick remembers the anxiousness of the group: 
By the time I spent 9 months or so working at Mark Friedman productions, I 
realized that I wasn’t very happy about how the company was running. I was 
having immigration problems, so I needed to work for a company that had more 
going for it. Dom and Greg were over at N. Lee Lacy with Jani. They wanted to 
have a company of their own for their own reasons. They weren’t happy with N. 
Lee Lacy. There was this young kid there who wanted to leave [also], which was 
David Fincher. Well, it didn’t take long for us to all go, “Well, let’s form our own 
company.”17 
 
Like the group’s other members, Fincher had had experiences making both music 
videos and commercials. In 1984, he made waves in the industry with a PSA for the 
American Cancer society that featured a fetus smoking a cigarette. He began getting more 
jobs as both a music video and commercial director, including a concert/music video 
feature film with Rick Springfield in 1985 called The Beat of the Live Drum. Fincher’s 
talent was apparent. Video producer Beth Broday remembers the day Fincher walked into 
her office with a reel: “I could see he had a good feel. When I listened to him talk about 
filmmaking, I knew he was a star. I signed him on the spot. On the spot.”18 Immediately 
Fincher became one of Propaganda’s in-house directors.  
 For producers Steve Golin and Joni Sighvatsson higher profit margins 
influenced their decision to focus on music videos and commercials. The New York 
Times published an article in 1990 profiling the two, the author states Propaganda’s focus 
on music videos as a “surprise of many in the movie establishment” because rock videos 
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were “a realm that most of Hollywood scorns as a low rent district suitable only for those 
of limited imagination or talent,”19 Golin detailed their strategy: 
The only game plan we had when we started was to establish a business that was a 
positive cash flow business, that would give us the ability to be more flexible, to 
finance our own development on our own terms. Revenue from the video and 
commercial business is enough to let us survive and to give us a certain credibility 
with directors who don't want to take a project to a studio.20 
 
Sighvatsson continued on how music videos helped develop talent as well: 
 
We also like the music video business for other reasons, and that has to do with 
research and development. It's a great training ground for new talent. Music video 
takes only three days and costs maybe $150,000, so how big a disaster can it 
really be, even if you put somebody really inexperienced in there? We use video 
as a training ground, and if the people are good, then we move them into larger 
projects.21 
 
Golin and Sighvatsson envisioned a business that could both provide a steady 
income and a training ground for high-concept directors who sought to promote their 
talent to an industry at large. Record labels would foot the bill for video productions, with 
the directors taking an additional fee for commission. By 1990, the work done for record 
companies provided revenues of about $20 million a year. 15 to 20% was added in 
commission for the company’s services.22 For example, with a budget of about $85,000 
for Guns N’ Roses’ Welcome to the Jungle, the record label would add an additional 
$17,000 for a 20% commission.23 The directors developed relationships with labels and 
artists, such as Dominic Sena and Janet Jackson, and would work for these enterprises 
continually. Such consistent revenue could enable the company to take on bigger 
projects.  
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 Unfortunately, due to various interview request denials and insufficient 
data in a variety of industry sources, including Variety, Broadcasting and Cable, and a 
vast multitude of US and British periodicals, Propaganda’s exact start-up costs have yet 
to be detailed. This has been an unfortunate thread in my Propaganda research, as very 
little was written about the company during its formative years, let alone information 
regarding the financial and organizational structures of the company. Dick however has 
given some vague insight to these initial investments, even though he himself does not 
recall the exact numbers:  
The initial money…I’m not terribly sure. I think Steve and Jani borrowed some 
money. Essentially it really didn’t take any money at all because, apart from 
renting an office, David, Dom, Greg, and myself were all freelancers. So we all 
just stopped working for our various companies on Friday and on Monday 
morning we were still being commissioned by labels. By the time one of us did 
the first video under Propaganda, the company had an operating budget. At that 
point it’s just when there’s money coming in, we’ll use that to pay for the 
secretary and we wont be paying it to somebody else. We were paying it to 
ourselves. Steve and Jani just borrowed to pay for the first month’s rent, and it 
sort of went from there.24 
 
Jani Sighvatsson recalled the initial financial backing in an interview two decades 
later: “We started the company with $100,000: Steve and I invested our own money, and 
the other $75,000 came from people in the garment business. We all shared the same 
goal: We wanted to make movies. Music videos and commercials were a means to an 
end.”25 The shortcomings of insufficient data are unfortunate and stem from my limited 
access to the company’s founders.26 One aspect is certain: Propaganda hit the ground 
running and produced a prolific amount of music videos within its first year as a 
company and garnered profits in the process. Its eager filmmakers were ready to keep 
that ball rolling. 
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However, music videos and commercials were not a means to an end for everyone 
involved, and Propaganda’s founders often touted rhetoric of collaborative action in 
retrospect. Nigel Dick saw things differently. “I didn’t have a fucking clue as to what I 
was doing. I was happy to be working. I was sorting out my immigration. One job 
finished, another one came along. I was hanging out with bands. I was travelling the 
world. It was an amazing experience,” Dick remembers of his first couple of years at 
Propaganda. “[The other founders] were all different. They always wanted to be 
filmmakers, as I hadn’t. I just stumbled into it, and I enjoyed it and kept on doing it. But I 
think for David, Dom, and Greg, they saw it as a route to ‘Hollywood.’”27 
These aspirations came with a capitalistic self-awareness. Dominic Sena has 
claimed to be the one who coined the company “Propaganda Films” after desperate 
attempts to come up with a name. “It was desperation, because Jani was staring to say, 
‘Why don’t we call the company Blue Ice?’ Fincher and I said, ‘We gotta come up with a 
better name than that.’ I thought, That’s what we’re doing, we’re selling propaganda.”28 
Utilizing a friend of Fincher’s, Bobby Woods, to create the Russian constructivist logo, 
the company had officially began branding itself. For Sena, the communist industry was 
appropriate, “We were very much into the idea of Propaganda being a collective.”29 Thus, 
as even implied by the company’s name, the tensions of art and commerce were inherent 
in the company’s makeup, where commercial work would enable its filmmakers to 
experiment with and showcase their filmmaking abilities.  
During Propaganda’s first year as a company, the organization worked out of a 
simple office loft.30 After about a year in the loft, Propaganda renovated its own 
warehouse on 938 North Mansfield Avenue in Hollywood. Dominic Sena remembered 
the dynamic in the new building: “As soon as one Propaganda director would finish a 
video, the other directors would check it out and you’d get feedback. It was very 
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competitive. We always gathered around the cappuccino machine, sharing stories and 
picking each other’s brain.”31 The company renovated the building into a contemporary 
workplace, whose lobby was a large atrium that often impressed visitors.32 The allure and 
appeal of such a space gave Propaganda a visual heft through the building’s architecture. 
Though the space was communal, with each director working under one roof, the visions 
of what Propaganda could and ought to be were varied. Sena believed that the setting was 
perfect for artistic progression, for the filmmaker’s career, and the company’s continued 
financial stability. “We were growing up and making mistakes and having breakthroughs 
together,” Sena reminisced about Propaganda. 33 Dick saw things differently: 
I think that that comment by [Sena] is bullshit. It was just like, “Hey, Greg. What 
are you working on today? Oh cool!” You know, “How’s he to work with?” To 
me, that was [as collaborative] as it ever got.34  
 
Dick recalls a specific instance of the tension between him and Fincher that illustrated 
these differences: 
 
I remember having one of our many meetings. We would have a meeting every 
week. And David would fly this flag about how things were going to be. I 
remember him saying we would have an art room with every kind of sharpie we 
could ever want. It was sort of this idealized filmmakers toy box that he had in 
mind. From my very practical perspective, I thought that that was never going to 
work. Somebody will steal all the crayons. Which is pretty much what happened. 
The reality of it was, we all worked out of the same building but we were all 
working on our own stuff.35  
  
While the collective mindset provided the professional drive to form the 
company, each founder’s desires to further one’s own success in the industry still held 
strong. The clichéd creed of “all for one, one for all” held little water practically. 
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 Already established careers meant Propaganda’s filmmakers did not have 
to start at square one in forming the company. After they left their respective 
organizations to form Propaganda, the men were still being commissioned by record 
labels to do video projects. Music videos were defined predominately by their directors, 
not the companies in which the directors were associated. When A&M Records needed a 
video for Janet Jackon’s single “Let’s Wait a While” from her album Control in 1987, the 
label contacted Dominic Sena. This started a relationship between labels, artists, and 
directors, which would often continue for years. By the time Virgin released the title 
track for the Rhythm Nation album, Jackson already had someone in mind to direct the 
single’s music video. “I knew who I wanted to direct ‘Rhythm Nation,’ that was simple: 
Dominic Sena,” said Janet Jackson. After working with him on "Let's Wait Awhile,” I 
absolutely fell in love with him. [...] Dominic understood story, and he could put 
onscreen, from front to back, the whole picture you had in your head."36  A&M Records 
financed $1.6 million dollars to produce a series of videos for the album, with “Rhythm 
Nation” being a component of Jackson’s “long-form” music video.37 Though money was 
initially tight, projects like Sena’s “Rhythm Nation” video would help give Propaganda 
financial sound footing. “By the time one of us did the first video under Propaganda, the 
company had an operating budget. At that point it’s just when there’s money coming in, 
we’ll use that to pay for the secretary and we won’t be paying it to somebody else,” 
remembers Nigel Dick about newfound independence. “We were paying it to ourselves. 
Steve and Jani just borrowed to pay for the first month’s rent, and it sort of went from 
there.”38 
 Went from there it did. Directors Dominic Sena, Nigel Dick, Greg Gold, 
and David Fincher directed upwards of 180 music videos in the first five years.39 
Including commercial spots, the number jumps above 200. Propaganda’s prolific output 
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was because of the extremely quick turnaround of music video productions.  Often music 
videos would film on weekends starting Friday. After a two or three-day shoot, the film 
was processed and ready to edit by Tuesday. After a week of editing, the first cut of the 
video would be ready to send off to MTV or whatever broadcast platform was awaiting 
the content. This efficiency was ideal for an album release, where multiple singles would 
need videos within a few months.  
 Propaganda’s videos ran on MTV constantly, mostly due to the high 
profile of many of their recording artist clients. A director’s association with a video, at 
least to MTV’s audience, would only go as far as a small credit at the beginning and end 
of the video, often displayed in small text on the bottom left corner of the screen. Soon 
Propaganda’s filmmakers would be associated with some of the biggest pop and rock 
stars of the era - Dominic Sena with Janet Jackson, David Fincher with Madonna, Nigel 
Dick with Guns N’ Roses. Other big-name pop stars worked with Propaganda during the 
period, including Tina Turner, George Michael, Steve Winwood, Billy Idol, Paula Abdul, 
Toto, Jermaine Stewart, Loverboy, Sting, Bryan Adams, Def Leopard, and White Heat 
within a three-year period. In 1987, Variety was already calling Propaganda “one of the 
most active suppliers of music videos”40 and record executives were quoted in The New 
York Times stating that “'when it comes to video, Propaganda is clearly the biggest, the 
best and, because [Steve Golin and Jani Sighvatsson] are such tenacious businessmen, the 
most expensive. Since Propaganda has consistently delivered results, you don't hear many 
complaints. People may be reluctant to acknowledge it, but Propaganda had a key hand in 
making stars of acts like Guns 'n' Roses.''41 
Propaganda also produced an increasing number of television advertisements.  
The reason was simple: they made more money for the company than music video 
commissions. “If a music video cost $150,000, you’d make $15,000,” remembers Sena 
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about the profit margins of Propaganda’s videos. “Commercials were a quantum leap. 
One of my first commercials was a perfume ad with Liza Minnelli. They paid me 
$35,000.”42 The bar for commercial productions had already been set high three years 
earlier. Ridley Scott’s ad for Apple computers based off of Orwell’s 1984 had made 
waves in the advertising industry for its scale and success. Debuting during 1984’s Super 
Bowl, the ad cost $500,000 to produce. “Ninety-six million Americans saw the '1984' 
commercial," says Steve Hayden, ad company Chiat/Day’s vice-president and the 
commercial’s creative director. "It had the highest day-after recall score of 
any commercial since the beginning of TV. Over 70% of those who saw it recalled the 
brand and the message."43 Scott’s influence on Propaganda’s stylization went beyond 
advertising. His film Blade Runner (1982) held a distinctive style that would come to 
influence a generation of young filmmakers. As I discuss in detail in the following 
chapter, that influence would be an almost defining trope for Propaganda’s work in both 
advertising and commercials, where aesthetics took on a Blade-Runner-like dystopian 
feel.  
Blade Runner would influence David Fincher heavily, as evidenced by this 
Japanese commercial for Coca Cola in 1993. Borrowing heavily from Scott’s film, the 
60-second spot featured a rollerblade-wearing gang of young men zooming through a 
dirty and foggy futuristic city street at night lit by an assortment of bright technicolored 
neon signs. The ad was just one example for the global brands that Fincher and others 
created while at Propaganda, including Nike, AT&T, YM magazine, and Budweiser. 
According to his peers, David Fincher was the driving force behind venturing into the 
commercial business. “He was very supportive creatively,” remembers Greg Gold. “On 
the business side, though, he was tough and strong-willed. He knew what he wanted and 
stuck to his guns. There was no defense against him”44 Fincher was known to have a 
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stubborn unfriendly disposition when working. His disciplined and unique vision for his 
work in both the music video and advertising industries made him a hot item. A 
retrospective of Fincher’s commercial work in Adweek, the advertising industry’s 
leading trade-magazine, heralded Fincher for not “going through the motions. Many of 
Fincher’s ads are industry classics that helped redefine the level of storytelling that you 
could cram into a commercial.”45  
As Justin Wyatt states in High Concept, these advertising campaigns “follow the 
design specification of corporate communications, in which the designer seeks to create 
and maintain consistent identities across advertising campaigns for corporations.”46 
Propaganda’s distinctive authorial vision ultimately translated well into compelling and 
visually striking advertisements. If Propaganda’s filmmakers were to be considered 
“designers,” it was their job to utilize their own particular styles in service of corporate 
branding. After three years of success, corporations were more and more willing to utilize 
the now-proven Propaganda directors for their own brands. Advertising productions 
increased after Polygram’s acquiring of Propaganda in 1991, but the seeds of this trend 
were firmly planted during Propaganda’s early music video years. Fincher, Sena, and 
Dick, by the end of their tenure at Propaganda in the mid-nineties, would all have had 
ample experience in commercial filmmaking. Latecomers to the Propaganda office, 
filmmakers Michael Bay, Spike Jonze, and Mark Romenek, would also begin shooting 
their own commercials with the company after their own arrival. Again, television 
advertisement’s lucrative nature was enough to have Propaganda’s filmmakers eager for 
advertising projects. 
Though advertisements were usually shorter than music videos, commercials 
almost always had longer production schedules. Television commercial productions were 
often the result of month’s long projects that include teams of people from a number of 
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organizations, including advertising agencies, corporate clients, and Propaganda’s own 
production crew. Productions could take a week to shoot (often for a 30-second spot) and 
the casting process was often drawn out, with clients and producers trying to see what 
actros would best fit the brand. 47 “By and large when you do a music video, you pitch 
your idea, you may have to go in and have a meeting and talk it through with a manager, 
a couple of people from the label, and the lead singer of the band or something, and then 
you’re off to the races. You go and you shoot it,” remembers Nigel Dick. 48 Commercials 
would have multiple pre-production meetings with upwards of two-dozen people in 
attendance. Everyone would try to have a say about how a final commercial spot would 
look. Often brands, advertising creative, and Propaganda’s filmmakers had varying 
opinions on how a product should be sold, what mood fits that product, and how a 
particular campaign fits into a larger brand narrative. 
THE VIDEO-MAKING PROCESS: “WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE” 
 When historicizing Propaganda’s output, often the focus has been on the 
recording artists and the music video directors, as evidenced by the auteur-driven 
chronicling of the company’s history in books like I Want My MTV or in other 
retrospective interviews. However, little has been said about Propaganda’s process of 
music video production. Music video production does give insight to structure of 
Propaganda’s process and details the appeal of the company’s work ethic: an efficient yet 
creative production house that can effectively and capably turn out a product that would 
help spur the recording artist’s continued success. This production history will not touch 
on the aesthetic make-up of the video, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3. However, 
this case illustrates the mechanics behind Propaganda’s operations. My reason behind 
detailing Welcome to the Jungle is due to my personal access with Nigel Dick and the 
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project’s scale, which eventually boosted Guns N’ Roses’ own success and became a 
staple on MTV.  
 By the fall of 1987, Nigel Dick had already made a number of music 
videos for the band Great White, featuring the songs “Rock Me” and “Lady Red Light” 
which were both released earlier that year. Great White was managed by New Zealander 
Alan Niven, who had recently begun to manage the American band Guns N’ Roses, who 
he felt had the talent and charisma to make waves around the country and potentially 
around the world. Niven felt a music video for the band’s lead single “Welcome to the 
Jungle,” off their album Appetite for Destruction distributed by Geffen records, helped 
further propel the band into stardom. Niven approached Dick for the video, who had 
already made videos for Niven’s other band Great White. “He played me the track, which 
I didn’t like, and I turned him down,” admits Dick. “Then he came back to me and says, 
‘Look, you got to help me out. I can’t find anybody else to do this.’ Whether people were 
turning him down or whether he was turning them down, I don’t know.”49 Dick admits 
that his association with Propaganda, at least in that early period of the company, was not 
the main reason behind why Nevins wanted to work with the director: 
It was just like, “I work with you, Nigel. I like the work that you do. I like your 
process. Here’s another job.” I think eventually people were getting work because 
they were associated with Propaganda, but because I was there from the 
beginning, I was sort of immune to that. I was just getting work because I was 
getting work.  
Despite still being reluctant to shoot the video, Dick agreed. However, because he was 
busy shooting a third video for Great White, Dick had a request about the production: to 
combine the Great White video shoot with Guns N’ Roses’ in order to make the 
equipment rental process simpler and utilize the same crew for both videos. Often, music 
videos were shot on weekends, where production equipment could be rented on a Friday 
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and given back on a Monday with only one day’s worth of rental fees, as the rental house 
did not count weekends in rental periods. “So we shot Great White on Thursday and 
Friday and we shot ‘Welcome to the Jungle’ on Saturday and Sunday,” remembers Dick 
about the quick turnaround of both productions. “We just made it like we were making a 
TV show or a movie. Tomorrow’s scene involves [Guns N’ Roses guitarist] Slash and 
today’s scene involves [Great Whites’] Jack Russell. We’ll save a bit of money of just 
keeping the same production team through both jobs.”50 51 Ultimately the budget for 
“Welcome to the Jungle” was around $85,000 as Nigel Dick recalls.52 “At any one time 
there is a median price that labels feel any new or 'developing artist' should have as their 
budget,” Dick describes. “That price will vary up or down depending on how much faith 
the label has in the act and how powerful the band's management is.”53 For a developing 
artist, “Welcome to the Jungle’s” $85,000 was a good pool. Guns N’ Roses were a band 
with good commercial potential.54 
 The band, with much help from manager Niven, formulated the concept 
and narrative of the music video, in which a new-to-the-city Axl Rose gets off a bus from 
his rural home town and enters the dark and grungy “jungle” of the inner city. Niven 
would sit down with the band to discuss how the video should be. Niven’s guidance was 
important as the band had many issues at the time, including drug use and a general lack 
of respect for much authority. Each party molded each step of the video’s planning and 
layout, with Niven formulating a cohesive narrative from the band’s suggestions and 
Dick storyboarding and visualizing that narrative for a music video. Niven laid out the 
progression for Dick: The video would begin with Axl getting off of a bus. After Axl 
exits the bus, he would see Slash drinking alcohol from a paper bag (which apparently 
was how the two actually first met). Then Axl would look into a store window and see a 
TV screen, which then transitions to Axl sitting in a chair – an homage to David Bowie in 
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The Man Who Fell to Earth (1976). It was up to Dick ensure that the band and Niven’s 
vision was accurately translated to the screen.  
 The production took only two days, with a majority of the shoot involving 
a mock live performance featuring an elaborate stage setup and a large enthusiastic 
crowd. The crew built a stage in a large Hollywood studio. Because of Guns N’ Roses 
already established fan base, it was not hard to get a large crowd of rowdy and excited 
fans for the shoot. “We would just open the doors and say, ‘Come down. Be in the 
video.’ It would be like, ‘Wow! It’s a free gig!’” recalls Dick of the crowd’s 
enthusiasm.55 Cinematographer Joe Yacoe filled the sets with high-contrast lighting, 
helping to enhance the seediness of the urban surroundings. The video’s shooting script, 
written up by Dick after his meeting with Niven, had a rough outline of the video’s 
various tableaus with small notes that pertained to the production schedule. The concert 
performance was to be shot on the first of two days. Dick attempted to make the ultimate 
live-performance setting: “I just wanted to be in a rock band, so this was the closest I was 
gonna get to playing the big festival stage. I would design the set, and they would rip it 
off and use it on their stage, which I found very flattering.”56 
The more elaborate narrative pieces would be shot with Axl on the second day. 
The following excerpt from the video’s shooting treatment explains the store window 
television scene, labeled “PART THREE” of the treatment. Indicative of Dick’s 
unfamiliarity with the band’s members was the fact that he misspells Axl Roses’ name:  
Axel’s POV of the television store window. There are a number of TV sets all 
showing various scenes of violence, civil unrest, contemporary advertising etc. 
These pieces of footage would need to be obtained from a library. The TV ads 
could be anything from the last 5 years but does not need to show package shots 
or product names. All the TV sets should be different. I would suggest we build 
this window on a set. (To be shot in a studio day 2).57 
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This narrative moment, as well as the others throughout the video, was to be intercut with 
live performance footage. Dick was a former musician, and consequently live 
performance is crucial to his music videos. Through performance, Dick felt the true 
“essence” of an artist could come through, showcasing their music-making talents to a 
live or broadcast audience. 
 Once shooting was completed on Sunday, editing the video began almost 
immediately.  The length of the post-production process has changed little in the decades 
since, with about a week given for the first cut. The editing was usually completed in 
Propaganda’s own editing suites, which contained the latest state-of-the-art editing 
equipment.58 Dick admits he was a bit too hands-on with the editing process, often 
directly dictating to editor Curtis Clayton where cuts should be made and what shots 
would go together. “The editor would sort of roll his eyes and on some level I can see it 
was very painful for [him],” remembers Dick. “Eventually [in later years], out of sheer 
boredom I would say, ‘Here’s the footage now go away and put it together and I’ll see 
you on Friday,’ Now it’s come completely full circle and I edit my stuff now.”59 All in 
all, the complete production process from beginning of shooting to the completion of the 
first cut was about a week. With this efficiency, Dick was able to juggle multiple projects 
at once and pump out his 26 credited music videos in 1988. Things only got bigger from 
there.  
 However, completing the video edit was not the end of the process. First 
came the band and record label approval, which often came quickly as both were 
involved with the pre-production and production process. Sometimes, band members 
would be allowed to view early cuts but this was avoided as it often delayed the 
process.60 More importantly, the video had to be approved by MTV in order to get 
broadcasted, giving the network power over Propaganda’s output and dictating what 
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would be ultimately shown to audiences. This approval was of course pivotal to a video’s 
success, as without the MTV platform an artist’s music video would mean nothing with 
no one watching them. According to Dick, Welcome to the Jungle hit a number of bumps 
before going on air:  
There’s a lot of violence in [the video]. There was policeman beating people in 
the head with a stick and whatnot. Then there was an undercurrent of fans and 
whatnot, and they agreed that they would only play it after 9 o’clock at night. So 
it was being played at night. And obviously they were hip to the fact that people 
wanted to see it, so they felt the necessity to play it but they were worried about 
moms and dads ringing up, “This is horrendous. These young people…blah blah 
blah blah.”61 
So despite a proclaimed independence to make music videos on their own aesthetic 
terms, Propaganda was still at the mercy of MTV’s approval process. Two years earlier, 
Tom Petty’s video for “Don’t Come Around Here No More” received backlash for a 
scene depicting Petty cutting into a young actress as if she was a cake. The video’s 
director, Jeff Stein, claimed that image is what pushed Tipper Gore to start PMRC, the 
Parents Music Resource Center, which hoped to increase parental control over the access 
of children to music and music videos. Apparently, Gore’s daughter saw the video and it 
freaked her out.62 In light of this organized backlash, MTV was nervous about harsh 
content like that in “Welcome to the Jungle.” MTV decided to broadcast the video late at 
night. Despite this, the video was popular, getting requested repeatedly throughout any 
given day. This popularity helped propel the band to greater stardom and would still be 
one of the most viewed videos on MTV.com still twenty years later.63 The following 
year, the video would win the Best New Artist Video at the MTV Music Video Awards. 
After this acclaim, the station was willing to play the video during prime-time hours.  
Despite the station’s initial reluctance, Nigel Dick feels the corporate influence is 
just a part of the filmmaking process. The more you play a part in a media system, the 
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more you are at the mercy of those parties involved. MTV and other media companies 
were still determining how to confront a vastly changing media-scape. Artistic freedom 
directly correlated to the economics of the business, where a director’s aesthetics had to 
match the desires of financial backers. Yet for Dick himself, there was still a feeling of 
freedom in his rock and roll infused filmmaking career. “And actually [with] music 
videos, you’ll have much more freedom than you would have with TV shows or films or 
with commercials,” Dick states. “So unless you’re using your own money, chances are 
you got to listen to the man. You know, that’s just the way it is.”64 
CONCLUSION - A NEW FORM OF PROPAGANDA 
 With the continued intent to produce feature films, Golin and Sighvatsson 
began having talks with Polygram Filmed Entertainment in 1989. Polygram had begun to 
make its own move to diversify its content after decades in the recording industry. Golin 
and Sighvatsson’s deal with Polygram called for the company to pay for Propaganda’s 
production costs in return for a share in film revenues. The arrangement gave Propaganda 
access to $40 million, which enabled them to produce more feature-length content.65 For 
Propaganda, the deal with Polygram still was at odds with the Hollywood studio 
oligopoly. Propaganda continued to seek talent that did not represent the Hollywood 
norm. Rather, innovative directors like David Lynch, who would soon work with 
Propaganda, appealed to their own independent and alternative sensibilities. ''It's not 
necessarily that we don't want to do business with the mainstream directors, but we can’t 
compete with the studios,'' Sighvatsson said in 1990 after the Polygram deal. “We can't 
pay the $5 million fees or gross deals or whatever. Personally, we are more comfortable 
with an arrangement like this, that will allow us to make two or three $10 million to $15 
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million movies a year.''66 With revenues at the end of that year around $80 million, it 
would be easy to keep up the pace. 67 
The ever-diversifying make-up of Propaganda’s content made Golin and 
Sighvatsson aware of new opportunities in the industry. A sale to Polygram would help 
provide financial support and corporate structure that would enable Golin to venture into 
quality independent feature filmmaking. This “independence” from the Hollywood 
majors could be achieved through its willingly limited production strategies. Quality 
overruled quantity. Steve Golin would have the production house he always wanted, 
where quality cinema could be produced in an efficient and profitable manner.  
With a steady number of music video and commercial commissions and a new 
relationship with Polygram, Propaganda was poised to enter a recently invigorated 
independent feature marketplace and continued to seek out talent to support. The most 
notable talent Propaganda wooed was director David Lynch, who had already made a 
name for himself over the past decade with the feature films such as Eraserhead (1977), 
The Elephant Man (1980), and Blue Velvet (1986). Lynch already had a loose 
relationship with Propaganda through his friendship with Monty Montgomery, who 
helped produce Twin Peaks. In 1988, Montgomery let Lynch borrow his copy of Barry 
Gifford’s novel Wild at Heart to gauge whether it would make a good film. Lynch fell in 
love with the book and immediately decided it was a project he would like to work on. 
Montgomery was happy to pass the project along. This would be a great opportunity for 
Propaganda to be involved with a respected American director. Golin, Sighvatsson, and 
producer Monty Montgomery were “all pumped up about it,” remembered Lynch. “I told 
them that I wanted to rewrite some stuff but that, while I was writing, maybe they wanted 
to get started on it and then we’d be underway. It was one of those things that once it 
started it was like a fire. It just burst into being.”68 This enthusiasm for the project paid 
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off, as Wild at Heart won the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival. Propaganda had 
now received international acclaim from a highly respected film organization. 
Propaganda’s intention to enter the feature-film market was boosted by 
Hollywood’s own support for indie filmmaking. This desire mixed with the already 
commercial nature of MTV broadcast indicates Propaganda’s willingness to incorporate 
itself into the system rather than push against it. Alisa Perren’s discussion of this era in 
Indie Inc. speaks of the notion of commerce overcoming art or the “move away from a 
particular strand of 1980s-era, art-house-oriented independents and toward Hollywood 
practices and conventions.”69 Indies “are viewed as ‘brands’ that exploit naïve or gullible 
consumers with their vacuous products.”70 Propaganda never positioned itself as 
outsiders, but rather a hopeful and eager insider what would use the era’s convergent 
media industries to make a name for itself and its filmmakers. Without the focus on 
music videos and commercials, Propaganda would have never been as sustainable as it 
became. While Golin had continued to herald music videos as merely a means to an end, 
the content produced by the company had elevated music videos and television 
advertisements towards a respectable and worthwhile form of visual production that 
would influence future directors such as Spike Jonze, Mark Romenek, Chris 
Cunningham, Michel Gondry, and Hype Williams.  
For some, the focus of feature filmmaking and the purchase by Polygram was the 
beginning of the end. The inherent dichotomy of art and commerce had begun to lean 
towards commerce. Though the company continued to produce innovative music videos, 
television advertisements, and feature films some believed that the glory days had ended 
and the initial excitement had dulled to professional obligation. For Nigel Dick, it was a 
surreal cycle, as he had introduced Polygram’s Michael Kuhn to Golin and Sighvatsson 
after leaving Polygram to join Propaganda. As Dick remembers, Polygram’s presence 
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marked the arrival of the “bean-counters.” Propaganda’s usual and continuous profit 
margin was not good enough for the new owners. “I believed that when we started 
Propaganda, that it was the six musketeers. One for all and all for one,” Nigel Dick 
reminisces. “That was the agreed mantra. We’re all in this together.” For Dick, the 
success that Propaganda’s founders hoped for would come to represent the end of the 
company’s independence. “Suddenly,” laments Dick, “it was just like working for any 
other film company.”71 
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Chapter 3: 
“Sometimes it’s enough to just have style”: 
Modes of Style in Propaganda’s Productions, 1986-1991 
By the time Propaganda was formed in 1986, the music video aesthetic had 
already begun to spread beyond MTV.  The film Flashdance (1983), undoubtedly 
inspired MTV’s rise a couple of years prior to its release, came accompanied with four 
music videos edited by the film’s director Adrian Lyne: “What a Feeling,” “Imagination,” 
“Maniac,” and “Romeo.” Each video featured clips from the film, such as dance 
performances or brief glimpses of narrative drama. In the summer of 1986, Tony Scott’s 
Top Gun mixed Kenny Loggins’ upbeat and high-energy pop soundtrack with the kinetic 
imagery of jets in flight and beautiful bodies in motion. Kenny Loggins’ music video for 
the Top Gun single “Danger Zone” largely featured images of the film intercut with 
Loggins’ vocal performance in a sun-soaked bedroom. As Paramount’s senior vice-
president stated during the period, “If you have a single playing on the radio, the spots are 
like cross-pollination,” providing a new means to promote the films and their soundtrack 
in order to reinforce the consumer’s need to either have or see them all.1 However, MTV 
became strict about music videos being too overt with their promotional nature. The 
network rejected Bob Seger’s video for “Old Time Rock and Roll” because footage from 
the film Risky Business (1983) was too prominent, prompting an MTV executive to say 
that the video was “a trailer set to a Bob Seger song.” Once, concert footage was added, 
MTV accepted the video.2 Hollywood studios began utilizing MTV for film promotion, 
such as Phil Collin’s video for “Against All Odds” from the film of the same name. 
Columbia Pictures spent forty-five thousand dollars on the video and built a completely 
new set to match the film’s imagery.3  
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While the promotional nature of videos was always apparent, their aesthetics 
merit further analysis. But in which perspective must we base these formal observations? 
As I have argued in past chapters, music videos have been both a response to and 
influence on convergent media industries where producers blur the lines between content 
platforms to serve niche demographics. However, when studying music video aesthetics, 
scholars are often obligated to shepherd their ideas under the particular umbrella of 
audio-studies. As Andrew Goodwin and Lawrence Grossberg state in the introduction to 
Sound and Vision’s Music Video Reader, their focus is to isolate an engagement with 
music video aesthetics within the realm of popular music. Their collection’s “concerns 
originate in the [various] contributor’s understanding of the place of music video in the 
popular music industry, and the social relations of production and consumption that 
center on that cultural apparatus.”4 For these scholars music videos are an extension of 
the music itself, a result of this audio-textual foundation. Scholar Carol Vernallis shares 
this perspective. Her book Experiencing Music Videos is one of the few substantial texts 
dealing with music video aesthetics. For Sight and Sound and other scholars such as 
Vernallis, audio guides visual components. In other words, it is song over visuals, as the 
visual content would not exist without the precedence of the song. I believe this is a 
limiting perspective in that it neglects the visual production of the video itself, where 
images and themes convey something beyond song and lyrics. Propaganda’s filmmakers 
had little to no experience in music recording, but their filmmaking skills undoubtedly 
contributed aesthetic components on their own. As Nigel Dick stated in the previous 
chapter, his role was often one of translator, taking basic concepts and molding them with 
cinematic techniques and methods in order to create product that would appease the artist, 
potential broadcasters, and current or future fans. For Dick specifically, these 
“translations” were an opportunity to showcase stylistic filmmaking that would support 
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Propaganda’s creative output. This use of cinematic style as a branding technique was 
shared by all of Propaganda’s filmmakers, who each left their own mark on the music 
video medium.  
Advertising was another means in which Propaganda’s filmmakers could 
showcase their visual strengths. Unlike music videos, advertisements do not have to 
follow an audial foundation. Rather, a brand message serves as the foundational text. 
Often brand messages were developed as television advertisements were conceptualized 
and produced. As advertising scholar Roland Marchand describes advertising and its 
reflection of present, visual texts “often found expression in styles and appeals that 
catered to yearnings unfulfilled by efficient, rationalized mass production and 
distribution” and reflected “subjective qualities.”5 Propaganda’s content often subverted 
ideas of mass production and distribution with subjective style, a style also present in its 
music videos. The same formal components were also present in television advertising, 
and Propaganda’s filmmakers often comfortable going between the two types of content 
forms. My formal analysis takes into account both commercial and formal elements of 
music video and television commercial production, because these varying elements are 
inherently linked within this promotional work. 
My research engages Propaganda’s visual content, particularly a deployment of a 
visual style that came to define the company as the go-to source for visually striking 
music videos and television advertisements. Janet Jackson’s relationship and admiration 
for Dominic Sena’s work was an example of an artist’s trust in Propaganda’s ability to 
develop high-concept and provocative visual representations of their pop star persona, a 
perspective that would fit comfortably within branding discourse, where products and 
services took the place of music celebrity. These conceptual strengths, while of course 
infused with the intentions of the pop artist or corporate client, enabled Propaganda’s 
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filmmakers experiment and utilize various cinematic tropes. While “Rhythm Nation” the 
song may have melodic, rhythmic, and lyrical components, the music video for “Rhythm 
Nation” goes beyond these musical delineations to create an audio-visual collage of 
music, fashion, dance, and persona. 
Using formal analysis of Propaganda Films’ content from its creation in 1986 to 
its purchase by Polygram Entertainment in 1991, my research aims to identify the most 
prominent aesthetic techniques, or as I call them “modes of style,” of a curated selection 
of Propaganda’s music videos and television advertising during this period. I argue that 
Propaganda’s visual style stems from cinematic formal qualities, but only to a point. First 
and foremost, they were a means to showcase capable filmmaking talent. Such talent 
enabled continued success in a variety of industries. As a result of watching a large 
number Propaganda’s work in music videos and television advertisements, I have 
selected four formal components that I feel were central in developing and showcasing 
Propaganda’s particular visual makeup. These four elements were present in almost all of 
Propaganda’s output, and I argue that they represent Propaganda’s aesthetic makeup. 
Propaganda was a content-making brand that specialized in these short-form visually 
intriguing texts, and I attribute that branding to lighting, editing, production design, and 
casting.  
While many other aesthetic components can be assessed, I argue that these four 
modes are the core of Propaganda’s pervasive style because of their role in physically and 
temporally shaping a pop star’s physical presence and thematic makeup, at least within a 
single video. The chiaroscuro trends of lighting during the period are reminiscent of a 
cinematic history of film noir and suspense. Shadows are just as viable a component of 
the visual spectrum as light and Propaganda continuously placed its subjects in the 
shadows. Music video editing, with its faster rhythm and melodious pacing, began to 
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shape Hollywood as well as television content. It gave energy and visibility to the 
otherwise invisible art of film editing and created new visually aggressive rhythms 
towards musically kinetic content. However, this visibility was sometimes neglected in 
television advertisements, when simple direct address was key to conveying a product’s 
branding message. Production design also harkened back to cinema’s own history, with 
the dystopian worlds of Fritz Lang inspiring Madonna’s own industrial society in her 
“Express Yourself” video. The urban and industrial fantasies of modern life were put on 
display in Propaganda’s works, with the artist often becoming a master of that domain. 
Finally, casting in Propaganda’s videos was not as simple as placing a pop star on screen. 
Sometimes, pop stars were absent from their created worlds, leaving beautiful young 
bodies as its main inhabitants. Whoever was present, their command of attention through 
physique and choreography gave life to dark and sexy locales. These traits give a sense of 
narration, but gender role’s relation to the pop artist often determined those structures. 
Even with this limited abstraction, a music video’s promotional intentions still rang 
through. Hence MTV’s own caution in broadcasting overtly commercial work and 
undermining the illusion of creative expression. Obviously in television advertisements, 
these promotional presentations were overt. That corporate directness was by no means a 
deterrent to Propaganda’s willingness to display innovative style. 
To engage Propaganda Film’s visual style during its first 5 years, I compiled a 
sample of fifteen music videos and four commercials from a number of Propaganda’s 
directors (See APPENDIX: PROPAGANDA SAMPLE for a listing of videos and 
commercials used). These particular music videos were chosen because they represent an 
even distribution of work done with Propaganda’s three prevalent directors: Nigel Dick, 
Dominic Sena, and David Fincher. The two outliers in my sample are Julian Temple and 
Michael Bay, which represent Propaganda’s earliest work as a company and the 
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beginning of the Polygram influence respectively. Also, my sample was selected to have 
an even distribution form year to year, with roughly three videos per year in the five-year 
period in order to not privilege particular periods in my timeline. Some artists have 
multiple videos within the sample, such as Madonna, Janet Jackson, and Guns N’ Roses 
(two each with the director being consistent for each artist) while others, such as David 
Bowie, have only made one music video with the studio. All content was produced in-
house by Propaganda and includes recording artists David Bowie, Madonna, Janet 
Jackson, Toto, Guns N’ Roses, Paula Abdul, Tina Tuner, Bryan Adams, Billy Idol, Styx, 
Divinyls, and Toto.  
The inclusion of television advertising in my sample, featuring the brands of Este 
Lauder, Nike, YM Magazine, and Colt 45, serves to incorporate other non-feature film 
text into my study. Television advertisements by Propaganda during this period were 
difficult to find, and my sampling has been largely dictated by what was available on 
online video databases such as Adweek and YouTube. In other words, I could only access 
the ads that I was able to view and could verify as Propaganda advertisements. The 
higher amount music videos in the sample relates to Propaganda’s higher number of 
music video productions compared to television ads during the five-year period of my 
study. The sample reflects these limitations. My advertising sample leans towards the 
latter half of my five-year bracket as Propaganda’s advertising work picked up 
significantly in 1990 as talks began with Polygram. During this period, David Fincher 
and Dominic Sena were the company’s two leading advertising directors, and my 
sampling reflects this with two television advertisements made by each director. As 
PolyGram bought out the company in 1991, the number of commercial productions 
increased dramatically because of the increased income the deal provided. Though a 
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limited sample, television advertisement’s inclusion in this analysis is an important 
component in engaging Propaganda’s visual style for its in-house directors. 
My methods are partially inspired by the work of David Bordwell, Kristin 
Thompson, and Janet Staiger in The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style & Mode of 
Production to 1960 in that this survey of Propaganda Film’s music videos hopes to argue 
for a “coherent system whereby aesthetic norms and the mode of film production 
reinforced one another.” Like Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson, my analysis involved 
watching many of Propaganda’s works and discerning similarities between them - a 
consistent style largely reflective of directorial intent - that indicate a visual amplification 
of pop stars and corporate brands.  
Music videos may indeed “follow” a song, to use Carol Vernallis’ term, but they 
also provided a visual accompaniment that in the MTV age could become the primary 
mode in which viewers/listeners may first come to contact with the artist or song. 
Propaganda Films’ curation and utilization of its young talent is a vital component of 
music video’s place in established filmmaking traditions. Style then becomes a means 
through which to differentiate a product within competitive capitalistic industries. Music 
videos are both a visually compelling way to promote albums sales and a method in 
which Propaganda’s directors can showcase their own talents. My concerns are with the 
former but are inevitably linked to the latter.  
Propaganda’s founders have spoken in interviews of the collaborative nature of 
their endeavor and a sense of communal aspirations towards opportunities in feature 
filmmaking. Does the visual components of their collective work, across a wide array of 
music genres and various iconic pop stars, support this claim to a unified “Propaganda” 
mode of style? Even if collaboration was heralded in retrospect, my analysis indicates a 
consensual understanding of promotional filmmaking’s potential to showcase provocative 
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imagery. Though these works would come to be known as David Fincher, Michael Bay, 
or Dominic Sena videos, they were also identified as Propaganda videos and that acclaim 
helped the company succeed for over a decade. This collective identification became a 
means in which to encourage progressive filmmaking practices in otherwise commercial 
ventures. “Editors and cameraman would hang out [in our studio.] We were growing up 
and making mistakes and having breakthroughs together,” claims director Dominic 
Sena.6 By looking at the four stylistic components of Propaganda’s work, I hope to define 
Propaganda’s style in this period amongst a variety of filmmakers. I argue these stylistic 
traits are what supported Propaganda’s stance as the leading visionary of short-form 
television program aesthetics. As one advertising industry member noted after 
Propaganda’s closing in 2001, “They really were, and maybe still are, the only real brand 
we've had in this business."7 
PROPAGANDA AND BRAND AESTHETICS 
Propaganda’s approach towards its content output was to utilize music videos and 
commercials as a means to showcase its own innovative filmmaking talent. Propaganda’s 
filmmakers indicated this capability in two ways. The first is an ability to efficiently 
manage the production process from conceptualization to distribution. Propaganda’s 
filmmakers, with the benefit of having previous experience in making these forms of 
content, were able to turn around productions quickly and efficiently. This enabled them 
to undertake dozens of projects in a given year. Record labels, advertising agencies, and 
various clients appreciated such efficiency as their budgets and precious products (artists) 
could be trusted with such capable workers. The previous chapter detailed this process 
and chronicled the various ways Propaganda’s methods were perceived by the industry 
and their own employees. The second means of promoting Propaganda’s talent was the 
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visual and stylistic make-up of the content itself. This is by far the most apparent 
indication of talent and capability, as it is “front-facing” and willingly and eagerly 
constructed to gain attention from viewers and other possible clients. Janet Jackson’s 
appraisal for Sena’s ability to put “the whole picture you had in your head” on-screen 
indicates an ability to translate concepts into visual and cinematic components ready for 
display. During Propaganda’s formative years in the late eighties, these videos were often 
provocative, energetic, and sexy. They had an allure that stood apart from other forms of 
television broadcast content. And sometimes, particularly with videos like George 
Michael’s “Freedom! 90” and Billy Idol’s “Cradle of Love,” these texts would become 
more notable than their pop-song counterparts. Gone were the days where live 
performance was the predominant component necessary for a visual representation of an 
artist’s work.  
 The continuing evolution of music video content has of course inspired various 
scholars to make sense of how to analyze music videos. Carol Vernallis, a composer, 
musician, and music studies scholar, explicitly states that music videos “follow the song’s 
form.” She goes on to detail what the music videos “intend” to do and how they operate 
in terms of narrative exposition: 
If the intent of a music-video image lies in drawing attention to the music – 
whether to provide commentary upon it or simply to sell it – it makes sense that 
the image ought not to carry a story or plot in the way that a film might. 
Otherwise, videomakers would run the risk of our becoming so engaged with the 
actions of the characters or concerned with impending events that we are pulled to 
outside the realm of the video and become involved with other narrative 
possibilities. The song would recede into the background like film music. Music-
video images gain from holding back information, confronting the view with 
ambiguous or unclear depictions – if there is story, it exists only in the dynamic 
relation between the song and the image as they unfold in time.8 
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Music videos stand as an excellent example of Justin Wyatt’s definition of high concept 
in that they work in two ways: “through an emphasis on style within the films, and 
through an integration with marketing and merchandising.”9 Vernallis’ points are valid in 
light of the high-concept nature of some of Propaganda’s works. One of Propaganda’s 
more elaborate productions, Dominic Sena’s “Rhythm Nation” video for Janet Jackson, 
projects a diegetic mythos of a highly industrial and mechanical police state in which 
Jackson has a position of authority. She is adorned with military garb and dances in an 
authoritative and rigid manner in front of a group of fellow uniformed figures. Sena and 
Jackson do very little to tell us about this world. The viewer only encounters a moment of 
performance within this intricate setting. Though we can infer a larger world beyond the 
video, Sena and Jackson do not give any details about that world. At most, we can only 
guess that Jackson, being the pop star diva that she was during the videos release, is the 
central figure, conveying an authority of stylistic cool. In this sense, Vernallis’ 
description of music video narrative is apt, as music videos can only “tell” so much, as 
she puts it, in light of performance and music.  
 However, must this depiction be subordinate to the pop song, as Carol Vernallis 
continuously implies? Can a visual image not become the driving force behind a music 
video or commercial text? Could these ideas work concurrently? Music videos during the 
late eighties implied a “changing ratio” in popular music cultures. As Lawrence 
Grossberg claimed in 1993, music videos acted as a metaphorical “billboard announcing 
a new media economy” where they are “located in a larger context in which visual media 
and images are competing with, if not displacing, music and aural images as the site of 
salvation and transcendence in rock culture.”10 Vernallis’ statements directly indicate a 
form of “loss” when these visual components of popular music and commercialism come 
to fore. The music becomes lost in the crowded and brief audio-visual text of broadcasted 
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content. However, I contend that this process is additive. Even in the time when Elvis 
was gyrating his body on national television, few would deny the power and influence of 
a visual image accompanying popular music. These images begin to transcend music and 
seep into other forms of content, whether they are performance-based or cinematic. While 
Vernallis’ discussions are an insightful example of how to begin to assess music videos 
formally, I contend that her perspectives are severely limiting as they place a hierarchy to 
the audial components of music video content. For Vernallis, the pop song is king with 
all other visual traits subservient to its control. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
Propaganda, record labels, and other retail industry companies saw potential in such 
promotion. Music videos were a way to garner popular music with new forms of imagery. 
Music videos were products in themselves, not just a means to support a song and its 
performer. While Vernallis’ analysis proves useful to begin aesthetic discussions, I 
consider Propaganda’s work on its own terms as a promotional cinematic text. The 
following analysis hopes to touch on how Propaganda’s contribution, that of provocative 
style, contributed to this convergent content form.  
As Propaganda’s credibility as a high-quality production entity grew in the 
advertising industry, the company started taking on more advertising jobs as a means to 
increase financial growth. Television advertisements also earned more money than their 
music video counterparts. Though television advertisements were much shorter than 
music videos, their goals were quite similar: to present a product utilizing cinematic 
formal techniques for broadcast distribution. While music videos were a historically open 
site for filmmaking experimentation, television advertisements also held the same 
possibilities for cinematic expression. This process “entails the making and selling of 
immaterial things – feelings and affects, personalities and values – rather than goods.”11 
The question then becomes whether Propaganda’s style reflects the making and selling of 
 88 
“immaterial things.” If we are to suggest that “services” qualify as the immaterial, then 
Propaganda’s self-promotion as a capable production house touches on the immaterial to 
some degree. However, the cultural “cool” of music video culture - the rock and roll and 
pop driven excess of a glamorous life filled with glamorous people – influenced its 
television advertisements. “I really concentrate on trying to make people look good,” 
Sena said in an interview with Adweek about particular tenants of his filmmaking. “I 
know there are a lot of really imaginative agency people out there who are real 
innovators, the movers and shakers who dream of the great, great stuff. These are the 
people I’d love to work with…”12 For Sena the lines between music videos and 
commercials were thin. Both could be a potential platform for experimentation.  
In the following analysis of Propaganda’s video’s formal elements, these various 
content-forms all hold consistent forms of visual style. These styles exist “separate from, 
and excessive to, the apparent narrative,” or lack there of, within these various texts. 
Though it may seem that style can be enough, Propaganda’s music videos play into a 
larger industrial structure. Despite this inherent contextualization, supported in part by 
Propaganda’s entering the feature film market in subsequent years, music videos and 
television advertisements are a component of American filmmaking, a new form of 
American cinematic tradition that continues to both influence new trends and reflect the 
period of their creation. 
ENGAGING PROPAGANDA FILMS’ MODES OF STYLE 
Lighting 
 American feature filmmaking during the 1980s marked growing trends in 
cinematography, particularly that of chiaroscuro or high-contrast lighting. High contrast 
lighting has often been seen as an aspect of generic style, notably that of classic 
 89 
Hollywood film noir. Film noir provided “a generic and visual touchstone” for content 
that “sought deliberately to differentiate themselves from a specific set of visual 
devices.”13 This high-contrast lighting style “opposes light and dark, hiding faces, rooms, 
urban landscapes in shadow and darkness which carry connotations of the mysterious and 
the unknown.”14 However, in the narrative feature-film, this high key lighting was often 
used to “hide motivations and true character” of individuals or to define a “psychological 
entrapment of [an urban environment’s] in habitants.”15 These subjective tropes were 
influenced by German expressionism, where the internal became the external and both 
light and dark were both components of mental and physical states. Expressionist motifs 
function “as a kind of visual italics, supplying mood and texture and removing the stories 
from a merely bland, everyday context.”16 Peter Yates’ Eyewitness (1981) and Win 
Wenders’ Hammett (1981) were early examples of 1980s cinema harkening back to 
earlier days of black and white cinematography. Joseph Biroc, cinematographer on 
Wender’s Hammett, cited this direct influence. “Actually the way I photograph is the way 
they photographed 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 years ago,” said Biroc. The result was “a color film 
shot like a black and white film.”17  
Propaganda’s filmmakers were inspired by vivid imagery that went beyond a 
“bland, everyday context.”18 Ridley Scott, whose film Blade Runner (1982, c. Jordan 
Cronenweth) created a neo-noir setting in dystopian future Los Angeles, influenced many 
Hollywood filmmakers during the period. Blade Runner’s influence absolutely informed 
Propaganda’s projects, claims Nigel Dick: 
I think all of us basically were trying to remake Blade Runner over and over 
again. We had all seen it separately, and the DP who I worked with on Welcome 
to the Jungle, Vance Burbury – I worked with him for 30 years and I gave him his 
first DP job, he was obsessed with Blade Runner. We all were, you know. And so 
I would say every video that came out of Propaganda for the first five years was 
sort of a Blade Runner knockoff on some way or another.  
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According to Paul Ramaeker’s account of lighting style during this period, this practice 
stemmed from the budgetary constraints of independent filmmaking, where the minimal 
financial demands of noir narratives became an encouraging factor for directors and 
producers to utilize the technique and produce stark images of a contemporary urban 
setting. 19 In other words, it was an economical means to portray vivid visuals. 
While each video conveyed its own thematic elements, consistent high-contrast 
lighting stands in contrast to other forms of cinematic content.20 Propaganda’s 
contribution to this trend was in bringing this form of cinematography to short-form 
television, i.e. music videos and advertisements. This gave a distinct look of a form of 
content that often utilized high-key flat lighting (a product of multi-camera studio-based 
television productions). The chiaroscuro look of Propaganda’s videos enabled them to 
stand out amongst the exponentially growing number of programs on cable television. 
This becomes especially important when considering channel surfing, where the decision 
of which channel to watch can be made in mere seconds of apprehending each channel’s 
visual elements.21 Such vivid high-contrast imagery encouraged viewers to participate 
and to look closely at an image.22   
 The influence of neo-noir is apparent in many of Propaganda’s music videos, not 
only in lighting but also narrative. For example, Guns N’ Roses’ video for “Welcome to 
the Jungle” (1987, d. Nigel Dick) begins with lead singer Axl Rose exiting a bus at night 
on a dark and noisy city street. The blackness of the city, dappled with the artificial light 
from signs and passing cars, surrounds him as he walks toward the camera and into the 
shadows (Fig. 1). This brief intro to the thin narrative is almost immediately abandoned 
in favor of a more traditional live performance segment (Fig. 2) featuring the entire band. 
But the noir-ish lighting techniques persist in the performance shots, with shafts of light 
illuminating the band, while the eerily featureless audience – a sea of bobbing heads and  
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Figures 1 and 2: The dark noir-like intro to the "Welcome to the Jungle" video quickly 
transitions to a live performance, but the high contrast lighting remains 
consistent. 
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lifted hands – is shrouded in darkness. Of course these lighting techniques are 
reminiscent of those of a live concert, with spotlights illuminating the artist for the live 
audience. Beams of light were also a visual component of Ridley Scott’s films Blade 
Runner and Legend (1985). Legend cinematographer Alex Thomson acknowledges that 
the use of high-contrast shaft lighting served no greater purpose than simple aesthetic 
appeal: “We had shafts of light that I sometimes had moving. Much of that was Ridley’s 
idea, and it followed through from the thing he did in Blade Runner with searchlights that 
moved about for no good reason at all except they looked quite good.” 23 While the use of 
noir-like imagery in “Welcome to the Jungle” reflects the themes within the song, with 
lyrics that directly relate urban environments to the light within them (You can taste the 
bright lights/ but you wont get them for free), it also presents environments embedded 
with an exciting and intense sense of mystery. Lighting amplifies this mystery and 
conveys a visual style that supports intense heavy metal distortions, volume, and 
rhythms. 
David Fincher’s direction of Paula Abdul’s video for “Straight Up” (1988) also 
utilizes high-contrast lighting but without a narrative framework. “Straight Up” deploys 
high-contrast monochromatic images that showcase Abdul’s ability as a dancer and 
choreographer. There are sparse depictions of props (fences, street lights, signs), but 
Fincher displays them in an abstract space free from physical context. We get the sense 
that this environment could be an urban setting, but these perceptions are undermined by 
abstraction. With simple white and black backgrounds, the lighting becomes the 
predominant visual component that shapes Abdul’s moving body, the bodies of her 
background dancers, and the inanimate objects. The influence of Scott’s films is perhaps 
also evident here, especially in light of Dariusz Wolski’s comment when he claimed, 
“David Fincher and I must have seen Ridley’s film Blade Runner about 1,500 times.” 24 
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Figures 3 and 4. In David Fincher's "Straight Up," high contrast monochromatic lighting 
amplifies Abdul's body in motion. 
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Fincher and the “Straight Up” cinematographer Peter Smokler increase the contrast 
between light and dark dramatically. Though not typical of the traditions of feature 
filmmaking, the high-contrast imagery works in that it amplifies the shape of the moving 
body, highlighting Abdul’s movements through the contrast of the monochromatic 
backgrounds of pure black and white. One moment, Abdul’s shoulders and face sink into 
the blackness of the background (Fig. 3) Abdul becomes a figure in abstract with lighting, 
or lack thereof, providing compelling and kinetic depictions of her body in motion. 
Dominic Sena’s commercial for Nike, entitled “Nike Heritage” (dp. Rodney 
Dana), utilized depictions of a city streets at night. The diegetic lights of a nighttime 
cityscape serves as the man’s primary source of illumination. Street sweepers (fig. 5), 
scaffolding lights, and street lamps highlight the shadowed runner as he makes his way 
through the city. Projected images of various sporting moments illuminate the building 
walls around him, conveying a sense of introspection and tradition the runner embodies 
in his otherwise mundane action of jogging. Projected light contributes to the thematic 
content and stands in contrast to the city’s dark surroundings. The chiaroscurist mixture 
of darkness and light contributes to the sentiments of the spot, with the runner’s isolation 
softened by the projected light of sports tradition and brand message. As the spot 
concludes, the runner is next to his own image projected on the wall behind him, creating 
a double visual of the man and his own “Nike heritage.” “There is no finish line” is the 
campaign’s message, as the man becomes a part of the tradition that surrounds him. 
While this particular spot stands as an obvious and high concept example of light’s 
relation to brand language, it exemplifies how high contrast lighting itself could aid in the 
content’s visual make-up and support thematic elements. 
Many other Propaganda productions also utilized chiaroscuro lighting to great 
effect. All works in my sample contained chiaroscuro lighting. Works by Michael Bay 
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Figures 5 and 6. Rodney Dana’s lighting for Dominic Sena’s “Nike Heritage” 
commercial utilizes an urban setting to incorporate diegetic high-contrast 
lighting. 
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(Divinyl’s “I Touch Myself,” 1990) and Nigel Dick (Guns N’ Roses’ “Sweet Child O’ 
Mine,” 1987; Toto’s “Pamela,” 1988) also utilized stark monochromatic imagery – an 
exaggerated noir style where vivid whites are adjacent to empty blackness. Janet 
Jackson’s video for the “Pleasure Principle” (1987, d. Dominic Sena) even begins with 
Jackson entering an empty warehouse-like studio apartment, another indication of noir 
urban settings, and turning on a few lights that do little to fill the vast expanse of her 
space. Nigel Dick’s video for Toto’s “Pamela” features brief depictions of the band 
shrouded in darkness against a white background, presenting them as featureless profiles.  
Again, the vividness of light and dark in Propaganda’s cinematography become an 
intentional exaggeration of the already stark imagery indicative of the decade. 
Editing 
 As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, Propaganda’s editors had varying degrees of 
autonomy but plenty of opportunity to hone their craft and excellent production 
resources. Propaganda’s three editing rooms were equipped with state-of-the art online 
editing systems that were often manned by a variety of editors, mostly freelance, 
throughout the day and night. “There was a pool of editors that were always in there,” 
remembers frequent Propaganda editor Michael Heldman. “Generally speaking a day 
shift and a night shift so that they can get as much work done as possible. Sometimes we 
worked out of those rooms. Sometimes we rented some gear and worked out of [a 
director’s] house actually. Some places had editing rooms we rented out so we often did 
that.”25 In the five or six days it took an editor to finalize a first cut for music videos or 
commercials, personal present for the editing process would vary from production to 
production. Some directors sat in on sessions and others allowed editors to cut content on 
their own without much oversight. “The process of editing, especially if you’re not 
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actually doing it, is actually really boring to watch,” admits Heldman. “Usually I would 
put something together and then get comments form the director.”26 Often directors 
would not be able to sit in with their editors because of a prolific production schedule, as 
Propaganda’s filmmakers would often be occupied with other projects.  
 For music videos, an aspect of editing was to balance or vary the ratio 
between narrative or thematic content and performance. For example, Nigel Dick admits 
that his videos focus heavily on performance, while David Fincher’s were often thematic. 
Rock bands such as Guns N’ Roses often had rock shows interspersed with their highly 
thematic narrative elements. Pop stars had less traditional displays of performance, with 
concert-like displays of musical showmanship foregone in favor of high-concept 
Hollywood musical-inspired displays of singing and dancing. This balance could be 
easily determined in pre-production, where artists and directors often conceptualize the 
video’s main themes. Editors would only be involved in pre-production and the 
production itself if the storyboards called for a special effect that would be done in post-
production. Otherwise, many editors would not see footage until the processed film 
arrived in their editing suite. A day or two was usually needed to catalogue the footage, 
which directors usually left to the editors to manage.  
In addition to the overarching balance between performance and narrative, music 
video editing also contained the seemingly miniscule decisions, such as when shots 
should occur and how long they should last. Editing, because of its inherent rhythmic and 
temporal makeup, has the closest relation to music. Often this relationship between audio 
and visual rhythm in music videos has been described as “MTV-style editing,” 
referencing the medium’s prominent platform. MTV-style editing simply describes edited 
content that cuts quickly in sync with music. In this sense, Vernallis’ insistence of music 
leading visual style often holds true. “Because it can establish its own rhythmic profile, 
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the editing can provide a counterpoint to the song’s rhythmic and timbral features, 
particular phrases in the lyrics, and especially the song’s sectional divisions” and 
“provide a counterpoint to the song’s rhythmic structures.” However, Vernallis’ 
observations then continue to generalize music video editing’s role in visual construction: 
“the editing in a music video works hard to ensure that no single element (the narrative, 
the setting, the performance, the star, the lyrics, the song) gains the upper hand.”27  
Contrary to Vernallis’ assumptions of music video editing creating a leveling 
sense of the varying attributes, Propaganda’s videos often imbalanced these traits and 
created greater emphasis on particular parts of the video and pop star’s persona. For 
example, David Fincher’s video for George Michael’s “Freedom! ‘90” greatly 
emphasizes the bodies of the video’s multiple actresses and actors and cuts between them 
arbitrarily. The cuts are quick and as the models lip-synch to the track, edits would cut 
from one model to the other in mid-lyric. Close-ups of mouths and faces are often 
utilized, emphasizing lyrics over a mysteriously absent George Michael (save for his 
iconic leather jacket and guitar). Rhythmically the cuts come quickly during the first part 
of the verse (I wont let you down…) but then transition to rhythmic cutting on beat during 
the verse’s second section (I think there’s something you should know…). The frantic 
cutting between images and actors occurs frequently throughout the video, whose average 
shot length is1.4 seconds. 28  The editing slows down slightly during the chorus (All we 
have to do now…), with the average shot length during the section being a half a second 
longer at 2 seconds (as opposed to 1.4 average during the verse). Later in the video, 
during an instrumental bridge, the editing speeds up considerably with fades to black 
coming between each brief shot. The cutting during this sequence correlates with the half 
note, occurring 2 times during a single beat. Also, images of exploding objects, a jukebox 
and guitar, occur roughly during crash cymbal hits during the chorus. At these moments, 
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the editing does follow the music but only briefly. The rhythmic correlation between 
image and song does not remain consistent throughout the entire video, only occurring in 
fitting and provocative moments. The varying visuals, aided by the lip-syncing 
supermodels (to be discussed in a following section), privilege the lyrics and imagery. 
Michael’s vocal capabilities are showcased despite own image being left out entirely.  
Dominic Sena’s video for Taylor Dayne’s “I’ll Be Your Shelter” has its own 
imbalance between cutting styles. The first verse of the song contains crossfades between 
shots. The overlapping images lyrically flow into each other. However, the chorus’ 
arrival ends the crossfading sequence and marks the beginning of the more traditional 
straight-cut technique. The straight cut’s increased frequency give energy to the video. 
Though the overall shot length is about 1.8 seconds for the entire video, there is an 
imbalance between the first and second halves of the video. The first minute of video has 
an average shot length that is roughly (due to crossfading) 4 seconds while the last 
minute of the video’s average shot length being 1.3 seconds. The song’s tempo and 
rhythm remain consistent throughout, so the editing increases the song’s visual rhythm, 
which correlates Dayne’s loudening vocals and repeated gospel-like singing. Again, 
editing supports the music by giving it an added boost of visual energy.  
Propaganda’s television advertisements were more conventional. As I mentioned 
in the previous chapter, commercial projects would often take longer due to more 
involvement by corporate clients and their advertising agencies. This practice extended 
into the editing room, where advertising creatives would often sit with editors to ensure 
an appropriate handling of brand image. Some spots had very little cutting, such as one of 
David Fincher’s ads for Colt 45 malt liquor starring Billy Dee Williams. The spot 
contains a 24-second shot of Williams speaking to the camera in his own apartment about 
the “power” of Colt 45. The camera repositions slightly as Williams moves towards the 
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middle of his apartment. The shot’s single edit occurs at the end and merely cuts to a shot 
of the Colt 45 can with simple copy. Dominic Sena’s “Nike Heritage” advertisement 
consists of straight cuts between runner and the surrounding city but also ignores the 
consistency of movement in frame. The runner, in various times throughout the ad, runs 
from left to right of the composition, from right to left, and from background to 
foreground. The traditional continuity of motion between shots is foregone in favor of the 
provocative images and lighting. The cuts are not motivated musically, but are a similar 
length to Propaganda’s music video editing. In the full-uncut minute and 30-second 
version of the spot, the average shot length stands at 1.9 seconds. Propaganda’s 
occasional utilization of music video editing in various commercials stands as the 
company’s most notable visual component in defining a rock and roll inspired style for 
the advertising world. Ad Week heralded this influence by claiming Propaganda as a 
pioneer of “the flashy music-video-inspired commercial” which soon became the 
industry’s standard.29 Editing then stands as an example of visual style translating well to 
other content forms. That translation and influence on an industry further solidified 
Propaganda’s hold on television advertising. 
Production Design 
 Propaganda’s production design often featured an elaborate urban or industrial 
setting, with homages to both noir and science fiction consistently incorporated into the 
space. Setting may be used to provide the audience a way in which to identify what genre 
a song or artist belongs to, in much the same way as an album cover, concert poster, or 
promotional portrait.30 While the dark and steamy world of contemporary or futuristic 
urban life was often utilized as a physical framework for performance, the ideas within 
these generic realms – primarily those of sexuality, industrialization, and frustration with 
 101 
Reagan-era conservatism - were conveyed through production design and allusions to 
filmmaking’s own past. These worlds were often fantastic in nature and rarely correlated 
with real locales. These influences stem from Classical Hollywood film noir and German 
Expressionism, which created “urban worlds (on artificial sets) that were carefully 
contrived to contribute to a sense of mood and to enhance the emotional valence of 
films.”31  They were worlds shrouded in darkness and home to social strife and a political 
order that suppressed individualism and personal expression. Propaganda’s videos often 
showcased the “suppressed,” even if abstractly. The influence of German Expressionism 
and film noir are not just thematic but directly evident in the designs themselves.  
 Dominic Sena’s video for Janet Jackson’s “Rhythm Nation” is one of 
Propaganda’s more elaborate examples of an industrial fantastic world conveyed through 
production design. The video has an opening sequence before the song begins. An 
elevator clinks down from up high in a dark, wet, and smoky factory-like setting. A Janet 
Jackson voiceover hauntingly speaks over the image, describing a “colorblind” world 
(visually supported by black and white cinematography). When the camera finishes 
panning across bellowing pipes, dripping walls, and cranking gears, a young man looks 
up at the elevator and quickly runs down from his post amongst the massive machine. 
The music begins and Janet Jackson, dressed as a futuristic policewoman, begins an 
elaborately choreographed dance with more than a dozen dancers behind her. 
Surrounding them are pipes and the mechanisms of a giant machine. As the video 
progresses, Jackson and her troop of dancers are shown in other locations within the 
factory: dancing on a dark catwalk, plodding through a dark corridor, and enacting 
military-like drills on a giant service elevator. Ridley’s Scott’s influence is evident as 
beams of light pierce through the pipes and move arbitrarily in spotlight as if someone 
has just sounded an alarm. Jackson dances confidently in front of this intimidating group. 
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Her authority of performance and dance shines through the shadows. The young man 
from video’s opening segment becomes a viewer himself, watching Jackson’s 
performance from a distance – specifically through a chain-link screen –compelled by the 
motion and uniformity of Jackson and her dance crew. Jackson’s dominance and 
authority in the video reflect her own pop star notoriety. "We're living in a very visual 
time right now," Jackson explained in 1990. "That's why videos are so important. Before, 
they really weren't. They play such an important part in the music business. The next is 
the live show. But the first they ever see of you is the video." 32 This awareness of music 
video’s cultural importance is what led Jackson’s producer Jimmy Jam to label her the 
“consummate video artist.” 33 
 
 
Figure 5. In the Dominic Sena’s “Rhythm Nation,” Janet Jackson claims authority over 
the music video’s dark and smoky dystopian world.  
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Madonna, another consummate video artist during this period, used similar 
themes of dystopian bleakness in her video for “Express Yourself” (1989, d. David 
Fincher). Inspired by Fritz Lang’s silent science fiction epic, Metropolis (1927), “Express 
Yourself” depicts a world starkly divided between an “upper world of privilege and 
pleasure, and a lower one of unceasing toil.” 34 The video features a bleak industrial 
society populated by muscular men as they pull levers a carry heavy metal beams across 
a factory floor. Madonna appears in contrast to this bleakness, portraying an almost 
angelic figure perched on the back of a large swan-shaped gargoyle. As the video begins, 
she is shown in an upper-class apartment, pacing about in front of a large window 
overlooking a grand city.  The sets look artificial, obvious models and matte paintings. 
Intercut with Madonna’s singing are images of the men hard at work in their grey 
environment. Finally, Madonna descends into the lower-realm of industry as she appears, 
dressed all in black, at the top of a set of stairs overlooking men pulling levers as steam 
billows around them (Fig. 7). The set design is simultaneously retro and modern, 
conveying a gothic monochromatic vision of an overbearing industrialized world. Much 
like Jackson’s authority in her own class-divided society, Madonna also maintains control 
through her literal elevation above other actors and her ability to appear in multiple 
environments, both opulent and industrious. Again, the physical setting enhances the 
power of the pop star over an otherwise bleak and undesirable world. Madonna’s body 
and glamour stand out amongst the monochromatic nature of her surroundings.  
Propaganda’s production design is not consistently reminiscent of genre cinema, 
as evidenced by Abdul’s more abstract video for “Straight Up.” David Bowie’s video for 
“Day In, Day Out” (1987, d. Julian Temple), one of the company’s earlier efforts in 
music videos, is a particularly elaborate example. Shot on location in Los Angeles, it 
shows Bowie frantically traversing through hotel hallways, city streets, and ransacked 
 104 
 
 
Figures 6 and 7. David Fincher pays homage to Fritz Lang in Madonna’s “Express 
Yourself” video.  The set, a colorized and modern version of those in 
Metropolis, give Madonna power over others and elevates her pop star 
status. 
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convenience stores. Guns N’ Roses’ “Sweet Child O’ Mine” (1987, d. Nigel Dick) uses 
the similar setting to that of “Welcome to the Jungle.” The band simply performs their 
song live, but instead of in front of a fan-filled audience, it is in front of the music video 
production team and a small group of roadies, a much more intimate affair. 
Fincher’s television advertisement for YM magazine also features an abstract 
urban setting. A young Angelina Jolie walks across an empty blacktop as black 
destruction derby cars drive around her in an empty urban lot. Spray-painted with aspects 
of a young woman’s life (“Guys,”  “Jobs,” “College,” “Friends,” etc.), the cars careen 
around her and eventually smash into each other. While the urban design of the space is 
apparent, the commercial conveys space in a subjective matter. “It’s her world,” the title 
states over an image of Jolie’s face, “We’re just living in it.” The phrase “her world” 
indicates this subjective if still ambiguous location, as if the space conveys a sense of 
calmness in the otherwise chaotic and violent coldness of urban life. Other Fincher spots 
utilize production design in a more straightforward manner, such as Billy Dee Williams’ 
stylish yet relatable apartment in the Colt 45 television advertisements. In these spots, 
Williams’ surroundings are a domestic and relatable depiction of modern life, a perfect 
locale to drink an equally comforting and “powerful” beverage. While not as high 
concept as Propaganda’s other designs, the Colt 45 spot showcases a tableau of 
contemporary life that conveys functional and elegant modernity. It is “cool” to drink 
Colt 45, and you do not need to have celebrity status to do so, despite the spot’s reliance 
on Williams. Both the YM and Colt 45 spots offer a more intimate and individualized 
approach to branding in a modern society. The actors are comfortable and confident in 
this urban environment, despite the vastly different designs of the physical spaces they 
inhabit.  
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 Despite these latter examples differing from the grim and fantastic worlds of 
Jackson and Madonna’s work, they still convey elements of modern urban life. Often 
recording artists are shown to be in control and comfortable in these spaces, whether it be 
Bowie’s antics through a city or Guns N’ Roses natural presence on a concert stage. 
These settings make the sonic tangible and support the power relations between pop stars 
and their admirers. For an artist like Madonna, this reflects own position as pop star diva, 
displaying her feminine authority over her fans, her music, her image, and media 
industries at large. Much like the movie star, the pop star becomes a master of his or her 
surroundings, real or imagined.  
Casting 
 Much in the way that settings enable a musical artist to have authority over space 
and setting, casting - the selection of actors and dancers for a particular music video – 
enables authority through depictions of the human body. In their most fundamental 
description, music videos are often depictions of human bodies in action within a 
physical space. Such an intentionally generic description at least touches on a universality 
of filmed entertainment or the performance of an artist for entertainment purposes. 
“Record companies and video makers,” Carol Vernallis states, “will try anything once, if 
only because novelty can break through the onslaught of commercial messages and grab 
the viewer’s attention. Why, then, has there not been a video that makes it difficult to find 
the lead singer?” 35 Vernallis’ question infers a universal practice of front men and 
women leading a music video through its narration. For pop stars, “the gamut of 
television devices available to television productions,” costuming, props, locations, and 
interactions with actors,” are “opened up to musicians in music video.”36 Musicians, 
particularly female musicians, have been quite adept at manipulating elements of visual 
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performances. Narratively, the lip-synching of lyrics while performing in a music video 
can act like an “omnipotent” presence to guide visual action.37 For example, Taylor 
Dayne’s video for “I’ll Be Your Shelter” enacts the premise of the title, with her singing 
guiding a group of men to a shelter from a rainy dark night. She addresses the group of 
men and the audience simultaneously, guiding the straightforward narrative along to its 
grandiose musical conclusion. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Actress Betsy Lynn George is the star of Billy Idol’s “Cradle of Love” music 
video. Propaganda’s music videos often had pop stars in a diminished role in 
their own music videos, supporting the beautiful young actors and actresses 
at the forefront of narration.  
Propaganda’s music videos are notable in that they sometimes did not depict a 
pop star’s appearance but the appearance of other individuals, often ones that are 
“beautiful” and “sexy.” Pop stars, both men and women, are often amongst beautiful 
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people, such as Madonna’s presence along side the muscle-bound men workers in the 
aforementioned “Express Yourself” video. Tina Turner’s video for “I Don’t Wanna Lose 
You” (1989, d. Dominic Sena), casts young actors as the predominant video figures, 
depicting a simple narrative of love gained and lost, with Tina Turner simply singing 
(narrating) over these images. Actress Betsy Lynn George (Fig. 8) is the focus of Billy 
Idol’s “Cradle of Love” (1990, d. David Fincher) when she appears at a man’s apartment 
(actor Joshua Townshend-Zellner) and seduces him to Idol’s song. Idol only appears in 
inserts, simply singing to the camera in front a single-color background. 
 
 
Figure 9. Models enact a particularly sexy depiction of fandom in George Michael’s 
video of “Freedom! ’90,” listening to and singing along to a song they seem 
to know quite well.  
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George Michael did not even appear in his video for “Freedom! ‘90” (1990, d. 
David Fincher) and in his place are five female models (Naomi Campbell, Linda 
Evangelista, Tatjana Patitz, Christy Turlington, and Cindy Crawford) and four male 
models (John Pearson, Mario Sorrenti, Peter Formby, and Jean-Ange Chiappi) who lip-
synch over Michael’s vocals, embodying his presence with their own beauty and 
physique. 38 The video begins with George Michael’s album Listen Without Prejudice 
Vol. 1 (the album in which “Freedom ‘90” appears) playing on a stereo system. What 
follows are a series of dark, almost monochromatic images (again, high-contrast lighting 
sets a sullen and introspective mood) of the various models lip-synching along with the 
song. They wear scantily clad pajama-like clothing (Fig. 9) (in some instances no 
clothing at all) and enact a casual appreciation of the song similar to a pop music fan’s 
own domestic practice of music listening. They listen, lip synch, and bob their head to the 
song while lounging on a couch, sipping a cup of coffee, taking a bath, working out, or 
smoking a cigarette. George Michael’s presence in the video is relegated to intimate 
objects: the playing of his album (in itself a marketing of the record for potential buyers) 
and the symbolic burning of his well-known leather jacket and acoustic guitar. It is 
almost as if the depiction of pop star is being purposefully neglected and deconstructed.  
These casting choices have an effect on gender dynamics within music video 
narratives. In a non-Propaganda music video, Cyndi Lauper’s “Girls Just Want to Have 
Fun,” wrestler Lou Albano lip-syncs to Lauper’s playful vocals. Scholar Lisa A Lewis 
states that the “replacement of the father’s scolding voice with the daughter’s parodies 
and undermines the authority of the father, and by symbolic extension, patriarchy 
itself.”39 However, in “Freedom! ‘90,” the gender roles are reversed with a variety of 
female models (and a couple male models) lip-synching to Michael’s vocals. Thus, in the 
case of the female model’s lip-synching, their presence is not undermined but rather  
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Figure 10. A model lip-syncs to George Michael's vocals, showcasing feminine beauty 
with a masculine voice. 
given authority through a masculine voice. This authority is also apparent in light of a 
model’s voice-less position in American culture, where women have no indication of 
personality or perspective beyond their physical appearance. They only need to look sexy, 
edgy, angelic, or whatever adjective is appropriate for their promotional image. Though 
these models are prominent in “Freedom! ’90!” Michael’s vocals give him narrative 
authority despite his visual absence. 
Propaganda’s commercials also utilized celebrity culture in the long tradition of 
advertising endorsements by some of the United State’s well-known actors and music 
entertainers. One of Dominic Sena’s first commercials for Propaganda, produced in 1988, 
involves diva Liza Minnelli promoting Estee Lauder’s Metropolis cologne for men. As 
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Figure 11. Billy Dee Williams directly addresses the audience in David Fincher's 
commercial for Colt 45. The confidence and swagger of William's celebrity 
gives him an authoritative presence. 
mentioned earlier, Billy Dee William’s cool demeanor, obviously inspired by Lando 
Calrissian in The Empire Strikes Back (1980) and Return of the Jedi (1981), carries an 
otherwise straightforward uneventful malt-liquor ad. The spot’s opening title card, “Billy 
Dee William’s talks about Colt 45,” is an apt description of what the act does - a direct 
message for a direct advertisement. Williams’ confidence and swagger helped the spot 
earn three Clios, the period’s most respected advertising award, including Best Director 
for David Fincher.40 Even thought Angelina Jolie was not yet the A-list celebrity she 
would eventually become, her casting placed an element of feminine beauty within the 
otherwise bleak advertisement. However, this practice does not directly relate to 
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Propaganda but the advertising industry as a whole, where casting can often be a tedious 
process. “[Advertisers] all got something to say,” Dick laments about the television ad 
production process. Often production meetings would include clients and advertising 
industry members saying things like “’You know, I think I’ve seen this guy, but I don’t 
think he’s right for our market. I want to go with the blonde guy.’” Nigel Dick 
emphasized this dynamic’s frustration: “I’m like, ‘Oh my God, these people...this is 
driving me insane.’” Meetings would often last for hours, much more than the casual and 
speedy pre-production meetings for music videos. 
Propaganda’s casting and use of models/actors often, as exemplified in “Freedom! 
‘90” and “Cradle of Love,” pushed the already notable presence of celebrity to the 
margins of their music video imagery. And celebrity endorsements in television 
advertisements easily fit the mold for trends at that time. Duran Duran’s guitarist John 
Taylor’s notion that “sometimes it’s enough to just have style” rather than narrative holds 
true in Propaganda’s auteur-lead utilization of glamor, especially in terms of casting. 41 
Pop stars are not a necessary component for the deployment of visual style. A simple 
presence of sex and beauty can work wonders.  
CONVERGENT MEDIA, COMPLICATED TEXTS – FINAL THOUGHTS 
As Propaganda’s own name implies, commercial projects were a welcomed and 
accepted part of the company’s development. Their later success with David Lynch and 
other Propaganda-produced feature film content would only solidify this transition away 
from promotional video focused organization that sought to utilize music videos and 
television advertisements as a means to further themselves and their aspirations. Of 
course the result of these changes were varied from person to person, and ultimately 
Propaganda’s “magic” would run out. After Propaganda’s closure in 2001, Advertising 
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Age labeled the company’s closing as an unfortunate end to a progressive style of 
cinematic commercialism. The article was headlined “The Rise and Fall of Propaganda,” 
giving the narrative a Shakespearian arc of success and inevitable tragedy.42 
Propaganda’s efforts in television advertising would greatly increase in the 
nineties, with directors such as Michael Bay, Mark Romanek, and Spike Jonze all 
contributing their talents to Propaganda’s already well-received output. With this new 
crop of directors, Propaganda would continue to push the boundaries of music video 
production. Mark Romanek and Spike Jonze in particular would continue Propaganda’s 
association with quality music video making. Jonze in particular would be called a 
“filmmaker ablaze with fresh ideas and fresh ways of filming them.”43 Right before 
Propaganda’s sale in 2000, Steve Golin produced Jonze’s first feature Being John 
Malkovich (1999). That movie would earn much acclaim from organizations like the 
Academy, who would nominate Jonze for the Best Director Oscar in 2000. Once, 
Propaganda was dissolved, Golin would found a new production company, Anonymous 
Content, which functioned much like Propaganda in that it produced music videos, 
television advertisements, and feature films all under one roof. One of those feature films, 
2006’s Babel (d. Alejandro González Iñárritu) would have Steve Golin nominated for his 
first Academy Award in the Best Picture category as producer. As recently as 2013, 
David Fincher harkened back to his early career and directed the music video for Justin 
Timberlake’s “Suit and Tie.” Of course, Steve Golin and Anonymous Content produced 
the video.  
Music videos as a visual medium in the eighties stood as young art form, one that 
John Dahl admits many Hollywood filmmakers were trying to “figure out.”44 Must non-
feature filmmaking always be placed within a Hollywood context? In other words, can 
they speak for themselves? Are these texts simply a visual extension of music, a visual 
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text whose sole purpose is support the audial text? Or are they a unique form of cinematic 
language, one that places conventions of film practice in the structures of popular music? 
To define music videos in these two last terms limits the perspective in which we can 
engage these works. Music video texts inherently encompass the convergence of a 
multitude of practices, industrial, cultural, and aesthetic. For Propaganda Films as a 
capitalistic entity, the collaborative effort to define a sense of cool style provided an 
aesthetic brand that promoted the company’s services. An in-depth formal analysis of 
Propaganda’s style inevitably leads to broader questions of music video and television 
advertising’s place in American film history. Simplistically, their relation is apparent due 
to Propaganda’s filmmaker’s own success in later years within the Hollywood system. 
While some may be hesitant to call music videos “cinema,” it is hard to deny the 
influence of cinematic practice on Propaganda’s work and vice versa. My work places 
this practice within media history discourse, simultaneously complicating an already 
complex narrative and detailing the familiar yet new-look styles in which these textual 
forms operate.  
This final chapter seeks to approach Propaganda’s output formally - where visual 
components define a mode of style. Often such formal analysis comes with the 
assumption that an aesthetic and artistic process is at work within and around the text. 
This comes in spite of the obvious commercial forum in which such content is produced 
and distributed. Commercialism has its own negative connotations within the academy. 
Once a very tenured professor for an Art History course asked a student presenting on 
music video’s aesthetic components if music videos “Were ever more than an 
advertisement?” and “Have progressed at all in twenty years?” If this was that scholar’s 
perspectives on music video content, I could only infer how the scholar felt about 
television advertisements and other promotional material. While such dismissive 
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comments may not be shared in a contemporary media studies department, still very little 
of this content form has been acknowledged in academic scholarship up to this point. In 
essence, my work on MTV, Propaganda, and the convergent media culture of the 1980s 
is an attempt to bring some validity to these discussions and meld new content forms 
(new for the academy, at least) with the tenets of media studies.  
Of course, this attempt itself raises its own questions. Should an analysis of 
commercial work be placed within this framework? Must we develop a language to think 
of Propaganda’s work on its own terms? My use of interviews is an attempt to discern 
Propaganda’s own perspectives of the media world at large. I can only hope that fellow 
scholars will pursue such inquiries further. As with any scholastic enterprise, only years 
of continuous research would prove any relevance. Propaganda stands as but one 
example of a diversified mediascape. Other companies and organizations are of course a 
part of this landscape. Further analysis and historicizing may help broaden our 
perspectives on the American media experience and provide more insight beyond subject 
matter that has already been greatly privileged. I can only hope that my efforts have been 
a contribution to such aspirations. 
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